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[1023] 
Issue Preclusion Effect of Class  
Certification Orders 
Antonio Gidi* 
This Article addresses the peculiarities of issue preclusion in class action certification, 
particularly after the approval of the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of 
Aggregate Litigation in 2010 and the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Bayer 
Corp. in 2011. After discussing the reasons why orders that deny class certification 
cannot have issue preclusive effect, this Article analyzes proposals to address the 
problem. 
 
 * Assistant Professor, University of Houston Law Center; Visiting Professor, University of 
Tennessee College of Law. S.J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School. I thank Geoffrey C. 
Hazard, Jr., Peter Linzer, Kevin Clermont, and William Taylor for helpful comments on earlier 
versions of this Article. 
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Issue preclusion in class actions has been a difficult and controversial 
topic ever since the birth of the modern class action. Yet no satisfactory 
resolution of the problem has ever been reached. 
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The controversy has come back in full force in the past few years, 
most recently with the approval of the American Law Institute’s (“ALI”) 
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation in 2010,1 the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision in In re Baycol Products Litigation in the same year,2 
and the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Bayer Corp. in the 
summer of 2011.3 
The persistency of the controversy is not surprising, given the 
importance of the subject. Both class actions and issue preclusion are 
extremely complex and important issues today, involving considerations 
of fairness, access to justice, and finality. Together, the preclusive force 
of a class action judgment represents one of the most formidable issues in 
modern civil litigation. 
Despite the importance of issue preclusion in class action litigation, 
we still do not have a satisfactory understanding of the issues involved, 
let alone any semblance of an adequate resolution of the many problems 
implicated. The matters have not been completely or adequately 
addressed, and they will only grow in relevance. This void is in sharp 
contrast with the overall field of res judicata law, which is extremely well 
developed and well settled.4 
This Article starts by briefly discussing in Part I the rules of issue 
preclusion in individual litigation. The Article then analyzes in Part II 
some peculiarities that arise in the class action context. In Part III, it 
analyzes the major question in the area, namely the issue preclusive 
effect of an order that denies (or grants) class certification. Some courts 
have given issue preclusive effect to such orders, in practice prohibiting 
the relitigation of the certification issue in future class actions. Other 
courts, and most recently the Supreme Court, have held that certification 
orders do not have preclusive effect. I demonstrate that class certification 
orders simply cannot have preclusive effect. 
The Article also addresses in Part IV the several solutions that have 
been proposed to deal with the problems of what effect, if any, to give to 
class certification orders. Finally, in Part V, the Article discusses the 
insufficiency of these proposals to deal with the subject and the need for 
a new approach. 
 
 1. Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation (2010). 
 2. 593 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 3. 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011). 
 4. See Robert C. Casad & Kevin M. Clermont, Res Judicata: A Handbook on Its Theory, 
Doctrine, and Practice 5–7 (2001) (stating that except for some details, “the United States today 
enjoys a semi-codification of most of res judicata law” and attributing such stage of development and 
uniformity to the long history of the device, the many treatises on the subject, and the Second 
Restatement of Judgments). 
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I.  Issue Preclusion in Individual Actions 
Although this Article focuses on the application of issue preclusion 
in the class action context, it is important to understand how the doctrine 
is generally applied in individual lawsuits. The focus here will be limited 
to the basic aspects of the preclusion doctrine that are most relevant to 
the topic at hand. By understanding the traditional rules of issue 
preclusion, we will be able to determine when they can be directly 
applied and when they need to be tailored to the peculiarities of class 
action litigation. 
Issue preclusion, previously known as collateral estoppel, prevents 
the relitigation of an “issue” decided in an earlier proceeding based on a 
different cause of action.5 Although its primary focus is on avoiding the 
relitigation of issues of fact, not pure issues of law,6 it is recognized that 
issues of law may also be subject to issue preclusion, particularly the 
application of the law to facts.7 For an issue decided in a proceeding to be 
precluded from being relitigated, the law imposes these basic 
requirements: (1) the issues in both proceedings must be identical; (2) the 
issue must have been actually litigated and decided in the prior 
proceeding; (3) the prior proceeding must have afforded a full and fair 
opportunity for the litigation of the issue; (4) the issue must have been 
necessary to support the outcome of the action; (5) there must have been 
a valid and final judgment on the merits;8 and (6) the defendant could 
foresee that the issue would later be used against her in a different 
 
 5. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 17(3), 27 (1982); Casad & Clermont, supra 
note 4, at 11–12. 
 6. Compare United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 242 (1924) (“Where, for example, a court in 
deciding a case has enunciated a rule of law, the parties in a subsequent action upon a different 
demand are not estopped from insisting that the law is otherwise, merely because the parties are the 
same in both cases. But a fact, question or right distinctly adjudged in the original action cannot be 
disputed in a subsequent action, even though the determination was reached upon an erroneous view 
or by an erroneous application of the law.”), with United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 
170–71 (1984) (“[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel can apply to preclude relitigation of both issues 
of law and issues of fact if those issues were conclusively determined in a prior action.”), and Montana 
v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 163 (1979). 
 7. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(2) & cmt. b (“[Issue preclusion applies to 
issues of law, except when] (a) the two actions involve claims that are substantially unrelated, or (b) a 
new determination is warranted in order to take account of an intervening change in the applicable 
legal context or otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of the laws . . . .”). For a broad 
discussion, see Jack H. Friedenthal, Mary Kay Kane & Arthur R. Miller, Civil Procedure 704–08 
(4th ed. 2005); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., John Leubsdorf & Debra Lyn Bassett, Civil Procedure 
642–44 (6th ed. 2011); 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal 
Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 4425 (2d ed. 2002); see also Casad & Clermont, supra 
note 4, at 130–34. 
 8. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 17(3), 27; Casad & Clermont, supra note 4, at 
113–48; 18 Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 7, § 4416; see also Adams Parking Garage, Inc. v. 
City of Scranton, 33 Fed. App’x 28, 31 (3d Cir. 2002); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Empresa 
Naviera Santa S.A., 56 F.3d 359, 368 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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proceeding.9 There are also several exceptions to the application of issue 
preclusion, though it is not necessary to discuss them here.10 
II.  Issue Preclusion in Class Actions 
Like judgments in traditional individual litigation, class action 
judgments also have issue preclusive effects.11 The parties in a class action 
are bound by the doctrine of issue preclusion in the same manner as 
parties in an individual lawsuit. Generally speaking, the same 
requirements of issue preclusion in the context of individual litigation 
must be met for the doctrine to apply to class action judgments.12 
A class action contains two types of causes of action against the 
defendant: one is asserted by the class as a whole (the class cause of 
action) and the other is asserted by each class member individually (the 
class members’ individual causes of action). This leads to what can be 
called the “two facets of class action preclusion,” because a class 
judgment binds the class as a whole (collectively) as well as the class 
members (individually). Accordingly, the class as a whole, the individual 
class members, and the defendants are bound by the decisions of issues 
that are essential to the judgment, as long as they were actually litigated 
and determined by a valid and final judgment.13 
 
 9. See Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979) (stating that collaterally 
estopping a party from litigating an issue may violate that party’s due process rights if it was 
unforeseeable that the issue would later be used collaterally against her); In re Microsoft Corp. 
Antitrust Litig., 355 F.3d 322, 325–29 (4th Cir. 2004); Hunter v. City of Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 121, 
124–25 n.4 (Iowa 1981); Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 443 N.E.2d 978, 987–88 (Ohio 
1983); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(5)(b). This is especially true when in the 
first action a party lacked the motivation or incentive to litigate the issue fully and vigorously. See 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 27 cmt. j, 28 cmt. i.  
 10. See, e.g., State ex rel. Westchester Estates, Inc. v. Bacon, 399 N.E.2d 81, 83 (Ohio 1980) 
(“Where, however, there has been a change in the facts in a given action which either raises a new 
material issue, or which would have been relevant to the resolution of a material issue involved in the 
earlier action, neither the doctrine of res judicata nor the doctrine of collateral estoppel will bar 
litigation of that issue in the later action.”). Some of these exceptions are prescribed in the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28. 
 11. See 7AA Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 1789, at 557–58 (3d ed. 2005). 
 12. See Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984) (“A judgment in 
favor of either side is conclusive in a subsequent action between them on any issue actually litigated 
and determined, if its determination was essential to that judgment.”); see also 7AA Wright, Miller & 
Kane, supra note 11, § 1789, at 559. (citing Laskey v. UAW, 638 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1981); Lee v. 
Criterion Ins. Co., 659 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Ga. 1987); McCormack v. Abbott Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1521 
(D. Mass. 1985)). 
 13. See Gribben v. Kirk, 466 S.E.2d 147, 151, 157 n.21 (W. Va. 1995) (stating that the defendant in 
an individual action brought by class members was collaterally estopped from relitigating an issue 
previously decided on a class action). The plaintiffs in Gribben had originally opted out of the class, 
but the court held that they were coerced and mislead into opting out and considered them as class 
members. 
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Certain problems, however, are peculiar to the application of the 
issue preclusion doctrine to class action litigation. More specifically, 
there are two particularly salient problems to resolve within the class 
action context. The first is whether class members who exercised their 
right to opt out of the class are allowed to assert in their individual 
lawsuits (as any nonparty would) nonmutual offensive issue preclusion 
against the class defendant. The second is whether an order denying class 
certification has preclusive effect in future class actions, in other words, 
whether a class action that was not certified by one court can be certified 
by another. I will address the first issue in a forthcoming article.14 This 
Article focuses on the second issue. 
III.  Issue Preclusion of Class Certification Orders 
A. The Problem 
The certification order is a peculiar aspect of class action litigation 
that does not fit well within the application of traditional doctrines of 
issue preclusion. For the past few decades, courts have been confronted 
with the question of which effect, if any, to give a previous court’s denial 
of class certification. 
The issue generally appears in two different practical scenarios. The 
first is where a second court (federal or state) is faced with the decision 
of whether or not to give preclusive effect to an earlier (federal or state) 
court’s denial of certification.15 The second is when a federal court must 
decide whether or not to issue an injunction to bar the plaintiff class from 
pursuing, in state court, the same class action that was originally denied 
certification in federal court.16 
 
 14. See Antonio Gidi, Loneliness in the Crowd: Why Nobody Wants Opt-Out Class Members to 
Assert Offensive Issue Preclusion Against a Class Defendant (forthcoming 2012). 
 15. See, e.g., In re Piper Aircraft Distrib. Sys. Antitrust Litig. (Piper II), 551 F.2d 213, 219 (8th Cir. 
1977) (involving a federal court not giving issue preclusive effect to a previous federal court class 
certification denial); Alvarez v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 892, 897 (Ct. App. 2006) (state 
court giving preclusive effect to a previous state class certification denial); Morgan v. Deere Credit, 
Inc., 889 S.W.2d 360, 365–67 (Tex. App. 1994) (state court not giving issue preclusive effect to a 
previous federal class certification denial). 
 16. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 
2003) (granting the injunction); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 
134 F.3d 133, 146 (3d Cir. 1998) (denying the injunction). Yet a third scenario occurs when a class 
action, after having the merits decided through trial and final verdict, is later decertified. Some courts 
have given preclusive effect to the judgment on the merits, while others have not. Compare Engle v. 
Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1259 (Fla. 2006) (giving preclusive effect to the jury’s findings of 
fact), and Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324, 1335–36 (11th Cir. 2010) (same), with 
Spitzfaden v. Dow Corning Corp., 833 So. 2d 512, 522 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that the trial judge 
decertified not only part of, but the entire class action). This scenario will not be discussed here, 
although the possibility of preclusion in this case seems likely after Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 
2368, 2379–80 n.10 (2011) (“[A] commonplace of preclusion law [is] that nonparties sometimes may 
benefit from, even though they cannot be bound by, former litigation.”). 
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The question is the same in both situations: Should a decision that 
denies class certification have issue preclusive effect and prevent the 
same class from attempting to certify the same class action at a later 
date? Or, to put it differently, once certification is denied, are the absent 
class members precluded from bringing the same class action again in a 
different court and relitigating the same certification issue previously 
decided? Is the issue of certifiability subject to issue preclusion? 
Although similar, the second scenario involves the added 
complexity of the propriety of a federal court issuing an injunction 
interfering with state judicial proceedings. This analysis is further 
complicated by the strict requirements and narrow exceptions of the 
Anti-Injunction Act17 and federalism issues.18 After decades of struggle, 
only recently did the Supreme Court hold that the Anti-Injunction Act’s 
“relitigation exception” does not allow a federal court to enjoin a state 
court from certifying a class action that has previously been denied 
certification in federal court.19 
The complicating factors raised by federalism make the search for a 
consistent rule on issue preclusion and class certification an elusive task. 
These factors do not arise if both class actions are brought in federal 
court,20 in the same state court, or in two different state courts.21 
 
 17. The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2010), provides that a “court of the United States 
may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act 
of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 
The exception “to protect or effectuate its judgment,” also known as the “relitigation exception” is 
based partly on the doctrine of issue and claim preclusion. Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 
140, 147 (1988) (“[T]he relitigation exception was designed to permit a federal court to prevent state 
litigation of an issue that previously was presented to and decided by the federal court. It is founded in 
the well-recognized concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel.”); Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. 
Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286–87 (1970) (explaining the limited exceptions to the anti-
injunction rule). 
 18. Compare In re Gen. Motors, 134 F.3d at 138 (“[A]ppellants’ requested injunction does not fall 
under any of the three exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act.”), and J.R. Clearwater Inc. v. Ashland 
Chem. Co., 93 F.3d 176, 177 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he instant denial of class certification does not come 
within one of the exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act.”), with Canady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 
1005, 1020 (8th Cir. 2002) (deciding that the denial of class certification comes within the exceptions to 
the Anti-Injunction Act), and In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 593 F.3d 716, 726 (8th Cir. 2010) (same), and 
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 769 (same). 
 19. See Smith, 131 S. Ct. at 2373 (2011). 
 20. The risk of relitigation of the same certification issue in the federal courts is reduced 
whenever several class actions are consolidated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. By 
concentrating nationwide class actions in the federal courts, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
(“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715 (2010), further reduces the problem, essentially 
because the statute prevents the certification of nationwide class actions in state courts. See Smith, 
131 S. Ct. at 2382 (finding that when federal courts address a common dispute, they should apply 
principles of comity to one another’s class certification decisions, even in the absence of 
consolidation); Timothy Kerr, Cleaning Up One Mess to Create Another: Duplicative Class Actions, 
Federal Courts’ Injunctive Power, and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 29 Hamline L. Rev. 217, 
235, 258 (2006) (noting that, in practice, CAFA has the same effect as the application of preclusion to 
a certification order); Kara M. Moorcroft, The Path to Preclusion: Federal Injunctive Relief Against 
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B. Reasons to Allow Preclusion of Class Certification Orders 
Proponents of preclusion of certification orders argue that the issue 
of whether the lawsuit can proceed as a class action (the certification 
issue) has actually been litigated once in a court of competent 
jurisdiction. The matter need not, indeed it cannot, be litigated again. 
Furthermore, they argue that the parties and the courts have spent a 
substantial amount of time, money, and energy in sorting out the facts 
and deciding the legal issues. The application of issue preclusion, 
therefore, increases judicial efficiency and economy because the class 
certification process usually consumes a large amount of time and 
judicial resources, particularly with discovery and attorneys’ fees.22 
Allowing the plaintiff class to relitigate the same issue again in different 
courts, they say, is not only wasteful, but unfair to the defendant. It may 
be considered unfair to submit the defendant to a repeated lengthy and 
expensive litigation over the same or substantially similar procedural 
issues of class certification.23 
As the Seventh Circuit stated in In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 
allowing relitigation would enable a plaintiff class to bring several class 
action lawsuits.24 Even if most of the courts would deny class 
certification, if a single court would certify the class action, “all the no-
certification decisions fade into insignificance. A single positive trumps 
all the negatives.”25 This could constitute illegitimate forum shopping.26 
 
Nationwide Classes in State Court, 54 Duke L.J. 221, 253–54 (2004) (praising the then-proposed CAFA 
as a “far better solution,” given the difficulties with the doctrine of preclusion). For an earlier 
assessment, see generally Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 461 (2000) 
(proposing ways to deal with overlapping class actions). 
 21. See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 2.11 cmt. a (2010) (“As yet, there is no 
comparable institution [to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation] for the coordination of civil 
litigation across the various states or between the federal courts and the various state courts.”); id. 
§ 2.11 Reporters’ Notes cmt. a. 
 22. See Piper II, 551 F.2d 213, 219 (8th Cir. 1977) (acknowledging that “[t]here are strong 
arguments that may be advanced for applying the rule of collateral estoppel to a class action 
determination when the plaintiff is engaging in multidistrict litigation” but ultimately refusing to do 
so); Moorcroft, supra note 20, at 226 (“In many cases, defendants and plaintiffs will spend two or three 
years battling over the initial certification decision in federal court. Fighting this same battle in 
multiple state courts, after it was fully and fairly litigated in the original federal forum, is 
fundamentally unfair.”). 
 23. J.R. Clearwater Inc., 93 F.3d at 179 (“[W]e are sympathetic to [defendant’s] desire to avoid 
another protracted and costly round of litigation over class certification in the Texas state courts.”); 
In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Exp. Antitrust Litig., 609 F. Supp. 2d 104, 106 (D. Me. 2009) (“[T]he 
defendants may . . . be deprived of realizing finally their hard-earned victory and have to start from the 
beginning in a different forum.”). 
 24. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 25. Id. at 766–67 (“This happens whenever plaintiffs can roll the dice as many times as they 
please—when nationwide class certification sticks (because it subsumes all other suits) while a no-
certification decision has no enduring effect. Section 2283 permits a federal court to issue an injunction 
that will stop such a process in its tracks and hold both sides to a fully litigated outcome, rather than 
perpetuating an asymmetric system in which class counsel can win but never lose.”); see Piper II, 
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In any litigation, “[t]he concern surrounding forum shopping stems 
from the fear that a plaintiff will be able to determine the outcome of a 
case simply by choosing the forum in which to bring the suit.”27 This 
concern becomes especially troubling in the context of overlapping class 
actions.28 The class, having already chosen the initial venue and upon 
receiving an unfavorable certification decision, can simply voluntarily 
dismiss its case and refile in another court.29 Furthermore, the class 
representative has a right to appeal an unfavorable certification 
decision.30 
 
551 F.2d at 219 (“[A]ssuming a fair hearing, a plaintiff ought not to have unlimited bites at the apple 
until he can convince a single district court that he qualifies as a class representative under Rule 23. 
This is wasteful and runs counter to the sound administration of multi-district cases.”); Note, Seventh 
Circuit Holds That Denial of Class Certification Can Have Preclusive Effect in State and Federal Courts, 
117 Harv. L. Rev. 2031, 2035 (2004) (“It is easy to sympathize with Judge Easterbrook’s frustration at the 
ease with which class plaintiffs and their counsel can dodge a court’s decision to deny certification.”). 
 26. See In re Piper Aircraft Distrib. Sys. Antitrust Litig. (Piper I), 411 F. Supp. 115, 121 (W.D. 
Mo. 1976), rev’d, 551 F.2d 213, 218 (8th Cir. 1977) (“[I]t would be entirely unjust and inequitable to 
allow plaintiff to renew its request for class action determination in six (6) other district courts after 
having been denied in the Florida action. It is quite clear that plaintiff is shopping around for the 
forum which would be the most receptive to plaintiff’s views. Our system of justice does not permit 
this type of action.”); see also Duffy v. Si-Sifh Corp., 726 So. 2d 438, 443 (La. Ct. App. 1999) 
(“[A]llowing the plaintiffs to relitigate the class action question in the instant case would encourage 
forum shopping, allowing the plaintiffs numerous ‘bites’ at the class action ‘apple,’ and frustrate the 
purposes of the res judicata doctrine.”); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements 
Under Attack, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1649, 1660–66 (2008) (discussing the search for the anomalous 
certifying court in the context of class settlements). 
 27. Olmstead v. Anderson, 400 N.W.2d 292, 303 (Mich. 1987). 
 28. See Wasserman, supra note 20, at 486–87 (“The protections and limitations built into 
preclusion doctrine—designed to protect non-parties and to ensure that only issues actually litigated 
are precluded—provide litigants with opportunities to ‘repackage’ class actions rejected by one court 
and file them in another court.”). 
 29. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41; Canady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 1005, 1018 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(“[A]ppellants may not . . . recycle the same claims and issues in different courts, hoping to achieve the 
result they desire.”); Piper I, 411 F. Supp. at 117–18 (discussing the plaintiffs’ claim that denial of class 
certification was not a conclusive determination of the issue and thus was not final for purposes of res 
judicata). 
 30. See Fed R. Civ. P. 23(f) (“A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or 
denying class-action certification . . . .”); see also 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, Rules, & Orders § 41 (2010) 
(stating that parties can seek reconsideration of adverse rulings and that trial judges have discretion to 
review these determinations). Before the 1998 amendment to Rule 23(f), however, the possibility of 
appealing a class certification decision was limited to the restrictive 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or other 
exceptions to the general rule against interlocutory appeals. See Gardner v. Westinghouse Broad. 
Corp., 437 U.S. 478, 482 (1978) (“The [§ 1292] exception does not embrace orders that have no direct 
or irreparable impact on the merits of the controversy. The [certification] order in this case . . . had no 
such impact; it in no way touch[ed] on the merits of the claim but only related to pretrial procedures.” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Switzerland Cheese Ass’n v. E. Horne’s Market, Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 25 
(1966))); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978) (“Federal appellate jurisdiction 
generally depends on the existence of a decision by the District Court that ‘ends the litigation on the 
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.’”); Georgine v. Amchem 
Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 624 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Coopers and Gardner). But see In re Rhone-Poulenc 
Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995) (granting a writ of mandamus and ordering the district 
court to decertify the class). 
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The risks associated with this situation did not escape the Advisory 
Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The committee 
recognized that the potential for abuse presented by “unfettered 
opportunities” to file the same class action in several different courts 
justified the application of preclusion to class certification orders: The 
class could escape more rigid scrutiny in one court by refiling the same 
class action lawsuit in another court, whose standards “may be less 
rigorous or the court may be more accommodating.”31 
Applying preclusion to the class certification order avoids 
“inconsistent results that tend to undermine [public] confidence in the 
judicial process”32 and also prevents “unnecessary friction between 
judicial systems.”33 It is also viewed as an essential element in the quest to 
avoid waste and inefficiency, the use of the class action for in terrorem 
strategic effect, and forum shopping.34 The reasoning based on the above-
described fears, however, has been severely yet deservedly criticized. 
According to one commentator, the Seventh Circuit in Bridgestone/ 
Firestone “certainly succeeded in eliminating the prospect of repeat 
litigation, but it did so only by expanding the reach of its prior ruling in a 
way that strayed from deep-seated principles of federalism and the law of 
judgments.”35 
 
 31. Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, Report of the Civil Rules 
Advisory Committee 2, 31 (2001) [hereinafter Advisory Comm. Report] (“The central focus is 
on . . . addressing some of the most pressing problems that arise from competing, [parallel, 
duplicative,] and overlapping class actions . . . .”). In addition to preclusion of the class certification 
order, the report proposed two other rules addressing the issue of parallel class action litigation: the 
preclusive effect of orders that refused to approve a class settlement and the court’s power to prohibit 
class members from filing the same class action in other courts. See id. at 31–37. Neither of the three 
proposals of this otherwise successful report were approved.  
 32. Clements v. Airport Auth., 69 F.3d 321, 330 (9th Cir. 1995); see 18 Wright, Miller & Cooper, 
supra note 7, § 4403 n.2, at 22 (“Preclusion serves both public and private values. . . . [and] protects the 
courts against the embarrassment of inconsistent decisions.”). 
 33. See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 2.11 cmt. b, at 179 (2010) (“Such 
friction arises with greatest force when the party opposing certification raises in a subsequent forum 
the same alleged defect that defeated class certification in the initial forum.”). 
 34. See Martin H. Redish, The Need for Jurisdictional and Structural Class Action Reform, 
32 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,984, 10,985 (2002) (arguing, furthermore, that the risk of duplicative litigation is a 
serious problem that defendants face, and that the eventual problems caused to absent class members 
with the imposition of preclusion of class certification orders are “significantly overstated”); see also 
Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class 
Action, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2035, 2115 (2008) (“[S]eriatim attempts at class certification are often 
controlled by a single group of entrepreneurial lawyers who switch plaintiffs and venues in search of a 
favorable result.”). 
 35. Note, supra note 25, at 2032, 2038 (“[T]he misguided decision the Seventh Circuit delivered in 
Firestone II shows that the easy options may well be the wrong ones.”); see Kerr, supra note 20, at 234 
(stating that the decision pushed the limits of Supreme Court precedent); Gary Young, Class Action 
“Tort Reform” Ruling, Nat’l L.J., July 7, 2003 (“[The] Firestone case . . . bowled over attorneys with 
its sweeping—and, some say, wrongheaded—curtailment of state court authority to certify nationwide 
classes after a federal court has declined to do so.”). 
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In 2011, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the notion that the 
mere fear of repetitive litigation of similar class action issues trumps the 
rule against nonparty preclusion.36 After all, the risk of repetitive 
litigation stems from the principles of federalism. 
C. Reasons Not to Allow Preclusion of Certification Orders 
There are no easy answers to this problem that has troubled courts 
and commentators for several decades. On the one hand, numerous 
practical, policy, and doctrinal considerations suggest that the application 
of preclusion to certification orders is the best solution under the 
circumstances.37 The ideal of judicial efficiency alone may be enough to 
claim that preclusion is the right choice: One full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the certification issue must be enough. 
On the other hand, regardless of how unfair and wasteful 
relitigation of class certification issues may be for the defendant and the 
court system, there are numerous practical, policy, and doctrinal 
considerations that advise, if not mandate, against application of the 
preclusion doctrine. Some of these are related to a strict interpretation of 
the doctrine of issue preclusion; others are policy considerations. 
The problem is complex and cannot easily be addressed by a 
mechanical application of the traditional preclusion doctrines. Indeed, a 
deeper and more thorough look at affording preclusive effect to 
certification reveals that it creates many more problems than it solves. 
Perhaps the issues of fact and law in both actions were exactly the same 
and were actually presented, controverted, litigated, and expressly 
decided in the prior litigation. Perhaps even the class was the same and 
was adequately represented in court and had a full and fair opportunity 
to present its position in the first class proceeding. However, even if all 
these requirements are met, there are still reasons why the application of 
issue preclusion to a certification decision might not be warranted. 
1. A Certification Order Is Not a Final Judgment 
In order to avoid the application of issue preclusion to class 
certification orders, some courts have argued that a decision denying 
 
 36. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2379–82 (2011) (citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 
901 (2008)); see Taylor, 553 U.S. at 883 (“‘[T]he threat of vexatious litigation is heightened’ in public-
law cases because ‘the number of plaintiffs with standing is potentially limitless.’ FOIA does allow ‘any 
person’ whose request is denied to resort to federal court for review of the agency’s determination. 
Thus it is theoretically possible that several persons could coordinate to mount a series of repetitive 
lawsuits. But we are not convinced that this risk justifies departure from the usual rules governing 
nonparty preclusion. First, stare decisis will allow courts swiftly to dispose of repetitive suits brought in 
the same circuit. Second, even when stare decisis is not dispositive ‘the human tendency not to waste 
money will deter the bringing of suits based on claims or issues that have already been adversely 
determined against others.’” (citations omitted)). 
 37. See supra Part III.B. 
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certification is not technically a “judgment” or a final determination to 
which issue preclusion can attach.38 It is simply a procedural decision that 
does not normally reach the merits of the case.39 Other courts have 
circumvented this technical argument in two different ways. One 
approach is simply to consider the denial of class certification a “valid 
and final order” that is subject to the doctrine of issue preclusion 
“whether or not the claim sought to be certified is subsequently 
prosecuted to final judgment.”40 Indeed, several courts have taken this 
approach.41 
Another way to sidestep the need for a “final order” seems to be 
more straightforward and intellectually honest. In Bridgestone/Firestone, 
the Seventh Circuit noted that issue preclusion does not depend on a 
final judgment.42 Instead, relying on the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments, the court reasoned that “for purposes of issue preclusion . . . 
‘final judgment’ includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another 
 
 38. Piper II, 551 F.2d 213, 219 (8th Cir. 1977) (“A class action determination is in the nature of an 
interlocutory order. As such, it must necessarily fall if the case itself is dismissed without a judgment 
amounting to an adjudication on the merits.”); see In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 146 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[D]enial of class certification . . . lacks sufficient 
finality to be entitled to preclusive effect.”); J.R. Clearwater Inc. v. Ashland Chem. Co., 93 F.3d 176, 
179 (5th Cir. 1996) (“An order denying class certification is not a final judgment, and therefore is not 
appealable as a matter of right until conclusion of the litigation in the district court. . . . Accordingly, it 
seems apparent to us that the denial of class certification similarly lacks sufficient finality to be entitled 
to preclusive effect while the underlying litigation remains pending.”); Morgan v. Deere Credit, Inc., 
889 S.W.2d 360, 365–67 (Tex. App. 1994) (“A class certification order cannot usually be characterized 
as final or irrevocable because it is subject to redetermination as the litigation progresses.”); see also 
Polk v. Montgomery Cnty., 782 F.2d 1196, 1201 (4th Cir. 1986) (refusing to apply collateral estoppel to 
a decision on liability in a class action while the damages phase was still pending because “[t]he 
decision . . . is not sufficiently final at this time to permit [plaintiff] to use the case to preclude issues at 
her trial. The . . . class action is still pending in district court. The court in (the class action) has 
changed the definition of the class once and conceivably the trial judge may modify the definition 
again.”). 
 39. But see Hazard, supra note 7, at 635 (“[A] judgment against plaintiff is preclusive not simply 
when it is on the merits but when the procedure in the first action afforded plaintiff a fair opportunity 
to get to the merits.”). This comment, however, is limited to claim preclusion in individual actions, 
whereas we are dealing with issue preclusion in class actions. 
 40. 1 Joseph M. McLaughlin, McLaughlin on Class Actions § 3:15, at 407 (5th ed. 2009). 
 41. See Johns v. Rozet, 141 F.R.D. 211, 214–15 (D.D.C. 1992) (finding that where the 
determination of class certification was “necessary to the settlement reached in the case,” issue 
preclusion should apply); In re Dalkon Shield Punitive Damages Litig., 613 F. Supp. 1112, 1115 (E.D. 
Va. 1985) (holding that alternative findings should be given preclusive effect when it has been 
reviewed and upheld on appeal); see also Deposit Guar. Nat. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 336 (1980) 
(stating that on appeal of a certification order, a denial of class certification stands as an adjudication 
of an issue). 
 42. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tire Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 767 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(“Although claim preclusion (res judicata) depends on a final judgment, issue preclusion (collateral 
estoppel) does not.”); see Piper I, 411 F. Supp. 115, 118–21 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (granting a motion to 
dismiss under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the class action issue was fully litigated and 
conclusively determined in a different action where certification was denied), rev’d, 551 F.2d 213, 218 
(8th Cir. 1977); 18A Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 7, § 4455.  
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action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive 
effect.”43 The basic idea seems to be that satisfaction of the “actually 
litigated” and “finality” requirements can rest on distinct parts of a case, 
and that an issue can actually be litigated at a preliminary or midway 
stage of a proceeding. 
The Seventh Circuit applied this rationale and held that its prior 
decision denying class certification was “sufficiently firm” to be afforded 
collateral estoppel treatment.44 It stated that its decision “was the result 
of focused attention by counsel in both the district court and this court; 
both courts addressed the issue exhaustively in published opinions and 
brought the debate to a conclusion; certiorari was sought and denied.”45 
Therefore, the plaintiff class was precluded from relitigating the 
certification issue, as long as the class was adequately represented in the 
first proceeding.46 
By referring to the adequacy-of-representation prerequisite, the 
Bridgestone/Firestone court touched the cornerstone of class action 
litigation. Indeed, the essential requirement of any preclusive effect in a 
class action is adequacy of representation.47 Because “absent [class] 
members are to be conclusively bound by the result of an action 
prosecuted or defended by a party alleged to represent their interests, 
basic notions of fairness and justice demand that the representation they 
receive be adequate.”48 Therefore, not only must adequacy have been an 
issue expressly controverted and determined in the first proceeding, the 
second court must also independently determine that adequacy indeed 
 
 43. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 767 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments 
§ 13 (1982)); see Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 (“The rules of res judicata are applicable 
only when a final judgment is rendered. However, for purposes of issue preclusion (as distinguished 
from merger and bar), ‘final judgment’ includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another action 
that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.”); see also Piper II, 551 F.2d 
at 218 (“[T]he class action [certification] issue was fully litigated and conclusively determined in the 
[prior action].”); Casad & Clermont, supra note 4, at 52–55; 18A Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra 
note 7, § 4455. For an earlier statement in a similar sense, see Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil 
Refining. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1961) (“‘Finality’ in the context here relevant may mean little 
more than that the litigation of a particular issue has reached such a stage that a court sees no really 
good reason for permitting it to be litigated again.”). 
 44. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 769; see Principles of the Law of Aggregate 
Litigation § 2.11 illus. c, at 216–17 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2008) (“Though not formally a final 
judgment, a denial of class certification is considered sufficiently definite to support direct review of 
the certification question at the discretion of the appellate court.”). 
 45. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 767. 
 46. Id. at 769 (“Our prior [decision denying class certification of a nationwide class action] is 
binding in personam with respect to the unnamed class members.”). The issue decided in the previous 
order denying certification, however, was limited to a nationwide class action. Id. Absent members 
were free to bring statewide class actions. Id. at 767. 
 47. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940). 
 48. See 7A Wright, Miller & Kane, supra note 11, § 1765, at 317. 
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existed in the first proceeding and that the class had a full and fair 
opportunity to protect its interests.49 
The rule that an issue determined in a prior action may be considered 
final if it was “sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect” was 
originally adopted in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments for 
application in traditional individual litigation.50 The Bridgestone/Firestone 
court, however, took this rule out of context and applied it to a delicate 
class action setting, which is a completely different environment from the 
one in which the rule was originally conceived. This solution may well be 
appropriate for individual litigation, where the parties generally are 
individuals with direct control over their own proceedings. In class 
actions, however, where the interests of numerous absent members are at 
stake, the situation is much more complex and does not lend itself to easy 
solutions. 
Indeed, one would be hard pressed to claim that any procedural 
decision at the certification stage is final.51 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(c)(1)(C) makes it clear that “[a]n order that grants or denies class 
certification may be altered or amended before final judgment.”52 “Such 
an order cannot usually be characterized as ‘final’ . . . . [because] it is the 
common practice to leave a class action order subject to redetermination 
as the litigation progresses.”53 Therefore, as a nonfinal decision that can 
be reviewed at any time during the proceeding, it cannot be afforded the 
“definiteness” of preclusion. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments 
 
 49. See In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 593 F.3d 716, 721–25 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Bridgestone/Firestone 
and stating that, for a certification decision to have preclusive effect, it is essential that the issue of 
adequacy be thoroughly decided by the previous court); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 768–
69 (“A decision with respect to the class is conclusive only if the absent members were adequately 
represented by the named litigants and class counsel. That requirement has been met. . . . Holding the 
absent class members to the outcome is no more an exercise in virtual representation than it is to hold 
them to a decision on the merits.”). But see Daboub v. Bell Gardens Bicycle Club, Inc., No. B200685, 
2008 WL 4648797, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2008) (distinguishing adequacy of representation from 
virtual representation, and holding that the class members were virtually represented in the first class 
action lawsuit); see also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 901 (2008) (rejecting the propriety of binding 
nonparties under a theory of “virtual representation” based on “identity of interests and some kind of 
relationship between parties and nonparties”). 
 50. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 (1982). 
 51. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) (“[E]ven after a certification 
order is entered, the judge remains free to modify it in the light of subsequent developments in the 
litigation.”); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 n.11 (1978) (“[A] district court’s order 
denying or granting class status is inherently tentative.”). 
 52. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C). 
 53. Piper II, 551 F.2d 213, 217 (8th Cir. 1977); see J.R. Clearwater Inc. v. Ashland Chem. Co., 
93 F.3d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1996) (“An order denying class certification is not a final judgment and 
therefore . . . . lacks sufficient finality to be entitled to preclusive effect while the underling litigation 
remains pending.” (citation omitted)); Rhonda Wasserman, Tolling: The American Pipe Tolling Rule 
and Successive Class Actions, 58 Fla. L. Rev. 803, 840–41 (2006) (discussing and collecting authorities 
on the issue of the characterization of class (de)certification orders as final and the preclusive effects 
of such orders); Wasserman, supra note 20, at 484–87 (same). 
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itself considered it a “general common sense point” that issue preclusion 
“should not be accorded [to] a judgment which is considered merely 
tentative in the very action in which it was rendered.”54 
In Morgan v. Deere Credit, Inc., a Texas state court specifically 
considered section 13 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments’ 
proviso.55 As we have seen, the Restatement determines that any prior 
adjudication that is sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect can 
be considered a “final judgment” for purposes of issue preclusion.56 The 
Morgan court, however, considered that a class certification issue is not 
“procedurally definite”; rather, “it is subject to change as provided in the 
rules.”57 Thus, “the issue of class certification does not satisfy the test of 
finality for application of issue preclusion.”58 
The argument that a class certification decision is not a “final 
judgment” rang particularly true before the 1998 amendment to 
Rule 23.59 Before Rule 23(f) was enacted, class certification orders could 
not be immediately appealed.60 Only after 1998, Rule 23 allowed 
interlocutory appeal of the certification order.61 Additionally, in the past 
it was common for commentators to say that when in doubt, the court 
should certify the class action and err on the side of caution. If later it 
was proven that the decision was a mistake, the court could always 
review it.62 In practice, however, it can hardly be said that certification 
 
 54. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 cmt. a; see Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil 
Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1961) (finding that a nonfinal judgment may be considered final for 
purposes of issue preclusion if, inter alia, the nature of the decision was “not avowedly tentative”). 
 55. See 889 S.W.2d 360, 367 (Tex. App. 1994). 
 56. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13. 
 57. 889 S.W.2d at 365–67. 
 58. Id. at 367. 
 59. See Hazard, supra note 7, at 611 (“[A]n interlocutory order, which is not ordinarily 
appealable, would not be treated as a final judgment for purposes of res judicata . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
 60. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 463 (1978) (holding that a class certification 
order is not “final” and therefore cannot be immediately appealed); see also Gardner v. Westinghouse 
Corp., 437 U.S. 478, 480–82 (1978); Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 624 (3d Cir. 1996). 
But see In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 61. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f); Moorcroft, supra note 20, at 239 (“When an order cannot be 
appealed, it can hardly be called a ‘sufficiently firm’ judgment that warrants federal court protection. 
The recent adoption of Rule 23(f), however, made class certification an appealable order; thus, the 
certification decision seems ‘final’ enough . . . .”). Although enacted in 1998, the idea of allowing 
appeals of certification orders is not recent, having been openly discussed at least three decades 
before, only two years after the 1966 Amendment to Rule 23. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bill 
Commentary: The Case for Comprehensive Revision of Federal Class Damage Procedure 58–59 
(1979); Comment, Adequate Representation, Notice and the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating 
Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 889, 921–23 (1968); James Andrew 
Hinds, Jr., Note, To Right Mass Wrongs: A Federal Consumer Class Action Act, 13 Harv. J. on Legis. 
776, 840 (1976). 
 62. See Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1970); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 99 (10th 
Cir. 1968); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968); see also Piper II, 551 F.2d 
213, 217 (8th Cir. 1977) (stating that class action determinations “cannot usually be characterized as 
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decisions are entered lightly or without extensive litigation and court 
review. 
With time, experience with class action litigation has revealed the 
importance of the class certification decision to both parties. If class 
action status is denied, class counsel will not be able to afford to proceed 
with the litigation in an individualized form, asserting only the individual 
claim of one class member against the defendant. If the class action status 
is granted, however, the stakes are magnified to a point where, regardless 
of the strength of the class claim, the defendant will feel pressured to 
settle. This was indeed one of the reasons why Rule 23(f) was enacted in 
1998, making class certification orders appealable.63 
As a result, in most cases class certification is a hotly contested issue 
and involves years-long battles, comprehensive investigation, and 
discovery, and is often appealed, in some instances reaching the Supreme 
Court.64 Therefore, in practice, any certification decision reached after 
absent members interests have been adequately represented is certainly 
“final.”65 This conclusion is supported by the Restatements (Second) of 
Judgments:  
[P]reclusion should be refused if the decision was avowedly tentative. 
On the other hand, that the parties were fully heard, that the court 
supported its decision with a reasoned opinion, that the decision was 
subject to appeal or was in fact reviewed on appeal, are factors 
supporting the conclusion that the decision is final for the purpose of 
preclusion. The test of finality, however, is whether the conclusion in 
question is procedurally definite and not whether the court might have 
had doubts in reaching the decision.66 
It has been universally ignored, however, that in practice, a 
certification order can be considered “final” in the above sense only if 
the decision is to deny certification. If, on the other hand, the decision is 
 
final” because, inter alia, the common practice is to leave such orders “subject to redetermination as 
the litigation progresses”). For further analysis see the cases cited in 7AA Wright, Miller & Kane, 
supra note 11, § 1785. 
 63. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1998 amendments) (“An order denying 
certification may confront the plaintiff with a situation in which the only sure path to appellate review 
is by proceeding to final judgment on the merits of an individual claim that, standing alone, is far 
smaller than the costs of litigation. An order granting certification, on the other hand, may force a 
defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class action and run the risk of potentially 
ruinous liability. These concerns can be met at low cost by establishing in the court of appeals a 
discretionary power to grant interlocutory review in cases that show appeal-worthy certification 
issues.”). 
 64. For the most recent such example, see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 65. See Murray v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 09-05744CW, 2010 WL 2898291, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 
July 21, 2010) (finding that the class certification issue had been “extensively litigated” in the previous 
class action in the first instance, on appeal, on a petition for rehearing, and on a petition for writ of 
certiorari, and holding that because the class had pursued every available avenue to litigate class 
certification and the courts had given the issue thorough consideration, the issue was “sufficiently 
firm” to be accorded conclusive effect). 
 66. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 cmt. g (1982). 
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to grant certification, and the class action progresses, the decision is not 
“final” and the court may change its ruling and decertify the class if it 
realizes that it was erroneously granted.67 In addition, a district court’s 
certification order may be reversed on appeal even after final judgment 
or settlement approval.68 Herein lies the problem with this theory, 
because it is unacceptable that the same kind of decision will be 
considered “final” in one situation and not in the other, especially 
because of its disparate impact on the parties: a systematic disadvantage 
to one of the parties (the class) and an advantage to the other (the class 
defendant).69 
It may seem ironic to argue issue preclusion in terms of coherence 
or symmetry of outcomes, in light of the abandonment of the mutuality 
doctrine in issue preclusion.70 However, while there is a reason for the 
abandonment of mutuality in both its defensive as well as offensive use,71 
there is no justification for a difference in outcomes in orders granting 
and in orders denying certification. Whatever one may think of the final 
character of a certification order, it is not enough to grant it preclusive 
effect. 
 
 67. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C) (“An order that grants or denies class certification may be 
altered or amended before final judgment.”); Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 
(1982) (“Even after a certification order is entered, the judge remains free to modify it in the light of 
subsequent developments in the litigation.”); Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 579 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (“If evidence not available at the time of certification disproves Plaintiffs’ contentions that 
common issues predominate, the district court has the authority to modify or even decertify the 
class.”), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 68. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (affirming the Third Circuit’s 
reversal of the district court certification of a settlement class action). 
 69. See infra Part IV.C.8 (discussing the necessity of a preclusion rule that is equally applied to 
grants and denials of class certification). It is true that, in some cases, the difference between a grant or 
denial of a motion may affect finality. For example, granting a motion to dismiss will produce a final 
decision, whereas denying it will not. However, in that situation, there is no asymmetry and no 
disparate impact on the parties. The situation is completely different in the case of a motion to certify 
a class action. 
 70. The erosion of the mutuality doctrine has a long pedigree. For earlier criticisms, see 
3 J. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 579 (1827), reprinted in 7 Works of Jeremy Bentham 
171 (J. Bowring ed. 1843); Comment, Privity and Mutuality in the Doctrine of Res Judicata, 35 Yale 
L.J. 607, 608–09 (1926). The case law trend started with Justice Traynor in Bernhard v. Bank of 
America, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 1942). In Blonder-Tongue Laboratory, Inc. v. University of Illinois 
Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 327 (1971), the Supreme Court endorsed the use of defensive nonmutual 
issue preclusion in federal courts, and in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), the Court 
allowed offensive nonmutual issue preclusion. 
 71. See Blonder-Tongue Lab., 402 U.S. at 328–29 (“In any lawsuit where a defendant, because of 
the mutuality principle, is forced to present a complete defense on the merits to a claim which the 
plaintiff has fully litigated and lost in a prior action, there is an arguable misallocation of resources.”). 
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2. Absent Class Members Cannot Be Bound Without Class 
Certification 
The most important doctrinal argument against giving preclusive 
effect to certification decisions may seem a mere technicality, but it is 
not. In order to bind class members, a proposed class action must be duly 
certified. Before the putative class action is certified, there is no formal 
class action and, therefore, no representation: The putative class 
members were not made “parties by representation.”72 Thus, it would be 
inappropriate to bind third parties. 
As we have seen above, there are several cases in which a lawsuit, 
even though originally brought as a class action, was adjudicated without 
ever being certified or litigated as such. In the absence of formal (or 
informal) class certification, however, the judgment may not bind absent 
members of the putative class.73 
Once a class action is actually certified, its representative nature 
mandates that absent class members be considered parties to the 
proceeding and bound by its decisions.74 It does not matter who the 
representative is. What is important to characterize the conflict is the 
class definition and the cause of action. The whole class (and each class 
member individually) is party to the proceeding and will be bound by its 
final judgment. Before the formal act of certification, however, there is 
no class action and the absent class members are not made parties to it: 
the certification issue is litigated entirely without their knowledge or 
participation through a representative.75 
 
 72. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (“[O]ne is not bound by a judgment in personam 
in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he had not been made a party by 
services of process.”); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 41(1)(e) (1982) (“A person who is not a 
party to an action but who is represented by a party is bound by and entitled to the benefits of a 
judgment as though he were a party. A person is represented by a party who is: [t]he representative of 
a class of persons similarly situated, designated as such with the approval of the court, of which the 
person is a member.” (emphasis added)); see also id. § 41 cmt. e; Wasserman, supra note 53, at 840. 
 73. See 18A Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 7, § 4455, at 466–67 (citing several cases to 
support an obvious limitation to preclusion: that “there must actually have been a class action, 
although formal failure to certify an action that is in fact treated by all parties as a class action may not 
defeat class preclusion”). 
 74. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 41(1)(e); 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., John L. Gedid & Stephen Sowle, An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect 
of Class Suits, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1849, 1850 (1998). 
 75. See Kerr, supra note 20, at 243 (“Without certification . . . there is no jurisdictional or rule-
based foundation for preclusion.”); see also Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 
618–19 n.8 (Ct. App. 2008) (“The protections for absent class members prescribed by rule 23, of 
course, are afforded after a motion for class certification has been granted, not by the filing of a 
motion for certification that is denied. Similarly, the concept of a ‘properly conducted class action’ 
suggests a class action that has been certified, following a hearing in which the named representatives 
have established they satisfy the requirements of rule 23, and then litigated to judgment or settled, not 
a[n] individual lawsuit in which a motion for class certification was denied.”). 
Gidi_63-HLJ-1025 (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2012 6:21 PM 
May 2012]     ISSUE PRECLUSION & CLASS CERTIFICATION 1041 
The Bridgestone/Firestone court tried to respond to this apparently 
insurmountable obstacle by arguing that, because any absent class 
member is entitled to appeal a decision denying class certification, every 
class member must be bound by it.76 Yet the fallacy in the court’s 
reasoning is apparent. First of all, on a practical level, absent class 
members theoretically may be entitled to appeal the denial of a class 
certification decision,77 but there is no real opportunity to do so because 
there is no notice to class members before class certification.78 Moreover, 
on a doctrinal level, the fact that a nonparty has interest to appeal a 
decision (or intervene in a proceeding) means only that the person has an 
interest to benefit from that decision, not necessarily that she will be 
bound by it if she chooses not to do so. Such a rule puts the law of 
representative litigation upside down.79 Notwithstanding the technical 
fragility of its arguments, the decision still attracted supporters.80 
In Murray v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the court was content that the 
district court in the previous class action had found that the class was 
adequately represented, that the defendant did not challenge the 
adequacy on appeal, and that adequacy was not being seriously contested 
before the court.81 The court limited itself to making general and obvious 
remarks that absent class members are bound by class action judgments.82 
 
 76. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 768 (7th Cir. 
2003) (“The premise of allowing class members to seek review by a higher court is that otherwise they 
would be bound by defeat.”). 
 77. For an example of absent class members excluded from the case who appealed an unfavorable 
class certification decision, see United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977). 
 78. See infra Part III.C.4 (discussing the absence of adequate notice as an impediment to granting 
preclusive effect to the denial of class certification). 
 79. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 41(1)(e) (stating the rule that in a class 
action the absent class members are represented by a party “designated as such with the approval of 
the court”); see also id. § 41 cmt. e (“Because the representative’s status is voluntary and non-
contractual, it is subject to careful judicial scrutiny . . . .”). 
 80. See Kevin M. Clermont, Class Certification’s Preclusive Effects, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 
203, 227 (2011) (“The Bridgestone/Firestone progeny . . . could adopt the proposition that certification 
of a class action is not necessary to render a judgment valid enough to bind absentees only on the 
determination of no certification.”). 
 81. No. 09-05744CW, 2010 WL 2898291, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2010); see Alvarez v. May Dep’t 
Stores Co., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 892, 900 (Ct. App. 2006) (“[T]here is no allegation that the representation 
provided to the plaintiffs in [the previous class action] was inadequate.”). But see Daboub v. Bell 
Gardens Bicycle Club, Inc., No. B200685, 2008 WL 4648797, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2008) 
(distinguishing adequacy of representation from virtual representation and holding that the class 
members were virtually represented in the first class action lawsuit); see also Taylor v. Sturgell, 
553 U.S. 880, 901 (2008) (rejecting the propriety of binding nonparties under a theory of “virtual 
representation” based on “identity of interests and some kind of relationship between parties and 
nonparties”). 
 82. See Murray, 2010 WL 2898291, at *5 (“In a class action, ‘a person not named as a party may 
be bound by a judgment on the merits of the action, if she was adequately represented by a party who 
actively participated in the litigation.’ . . . That Plaintiff was not a named plaintiff, class representative, 
witness or deponent in the [previous class action] is not significant because such is the case with 
virtually every member in every class action. Here, the issue is whether Plaintiff was adequately 
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The weakness of this argument is apparent. The Murray court did 
not address the fact that the class certification order was ultimately 
reversed and there was no class certification in the prior class action.83 
Kevin Clermont criticized this decision as “a suspect application of 
collateral estoppel against the victorious party” because it was based on 
the district court’s reversed certification in the prior class action and the 
class had no incentive to appeal such decision.84 Clermont also criticized 
the decision because the finding of adequacy was rendered nonessential 
by its reversal and could not be accorded preclusive effect.85 
The Murray court thought it relevant that the class was represented 
by the same lead counsel in both class actions and considered this as 
evidence that the class was trying to deliberately maneuver to avoid the 
effects of the previous class certification order.86 Although the detail of 
which lawyer or law firm represented the class may be considered an 
interesting curiosity for the blogosphere, the name of the class counsel 
should not play any role in determining whether a party is bound by issue 
preclusion from a previous lawsuit.87 It is unclear how that irrelevant 
 
represented in the [previous] case, and the Court finds that he was.” (quoting Taylor, 553 U.S. at 
884)). 
 83. The Seventh Circuit addressed the issue but dismissed it. See Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 624 F.3d 842, 854 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he class . . . was certified, albeit later decertified at our 
direction.”). 
 84. Clermont, supra note 80, at 208 n.22 (“[A] finding which a party had no incentive (other than 
fear of collateral estoppel) to appeal, because he won, has no collateral estoppel effect.” (quoting 
LaBuhn v. Bulkmatic Transp. Co., 865 F.2d 119, 122 (7th Cir. 1988))); see Casad & Clermont, supra 
note 4, at 138–39 (stating that whenever a party cannot appeal an issue there is no issue preclusion). 
 85. See Clermont, supra note 80, at 208. The author extended his criticisms to 
Bridgestone/Firestone and Baycol Products. 
 86. See 2010 WL 2898291, at *5. The Seventh Circuit and the California Court of Appeals also 
appeared intrigued by this fact. See Thorogood, 624 F.3d at 844, 847 (making unnecessary personal 
comments about class counsel, including stating his name several times); Alvarez, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
892, 901 (“We conclude that similarity of counsel is one factor that may be considered on the issue of 
whether a non-party’s interest was truly represented in the first lawsuit.”); see also Wolff, supra 
note 34, at 2115 (“[S]eriatim attempts at class certification are often controlled by a single group of 
entrepreneurial lawyers who switch plaintiffs and venues in search of a favorable result.”). No one 
doubts that this is sociologically relevant information. What is not clear is its legal relevance. 
 87. With its decision in Sondel v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 1995), the Eighth 
Circuit is in a class of its own. In Sondel, class representatives filed a class action lawsuit in federal 
court against Northwest. Id. at 936. After the state law claim was dismissed from the federal class 
action, the class representatives, represented by the same attorneys, filed a class action in state court to 
pursue the state claim. Id. The state court refused to certify the class action and, proceeding as an 
individual lawsuit, the case went to trial and was decided on the merits in favor of the defendants. Id. 
at 936–37. Following the state court decision, the federal court granted Northwest’s motion for 
summary judgment and dismissed the federal class action with prejudice, because the absent class 
members were in privity with the plaintiffs in the state court. Id. at 937. According to the Eight Circuit, 
because they were the class representative in the federal court, the plaintiffs in the state court, 
although pursuing an individual lawsuit, represented the interests of the absent class members in the 
state suit. Id. at 938–39. Therefore, the absent class members were bound by issue and claim preclusion 
on the merits of the class claim. Id. at 940. In reaching this awkward conclusion, the Eight Circuit was 
influenced by the fact that the attorneys who represented the plaintiffs in the individual lawsuit in state 
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detail really influenced the decision and how the court would have 
reacted if the lawyers were not the same. In any event, the message was 
received: Class counsel must be more creative from now on and learn to 
share, inviting another attorney to independently pursue the litigation. 
A previous version of the ALI’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate 
Litigation seemed to recognize that absent class members were not actual 
parties to a class action before certification.88 However, in reasoning 
remarkably similar to Bridgestone/Firestone, the ALI bypassed that 
“small detail” because “the class-certification determination is made as 
to the entire proposed class, not as to individual class members.”89 This 
argument does not stand on solid logical ground. The argument seems to 
say that the class certification order binds all absent class members 
because it was issued to affect the class as a whole. This clearly confuses 
the scope of a class certification decision with its preclusive effect: The 
mere fact that a decision affects a third person cannot be the reason why 
that third person can be bound by it. 
The Supreme Court put the controversy to rest in Smith v. Bayer 
Corp., holding unambiguously that an absent class member is not a party 
to a class action that was not certified and, although she may benefit 
from it, she can never be bound by it.90 That decision certainly came as a 
surprise to Judge Posner, who had stated a few months before that “[w]e 
do not think it likely that the Court [in Smith] will go so far as to hold 
that injunctive relief against class-action harassment is inappropriate 
 
court were the same as those who represented the class in federal court, and that the class counsel 
would not “introduce any additional evidence beyond that presented at the state trial.” Id. This 
strange decision seriously upsets the delicate due process balance that exists in binding absent class 
members in representative litigation. 
 88. See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 2.11 Reporters’ Notes cmt. c 
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2008) (“Though absent class members are considered parties for some 
purposes upon class certification . . . absent class members do not become parties when class 
certification is denied.”).  
 89. Id. (“As a conceptual matter and in terms of practice . . . the class-certification determination 
is made as to the entire proposed class, not as to individual class members. It thus is appropriate to 
treat absent class members as parties for issue-preclusion purposes, if only when the determination 
said to have issue-preclusive effect is the class-certification determination itself.”). 
 90. 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2380 (2011) (“Neither a proposed class action nor a rejected class action may 
bind nonparties.”); see Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 16 n.1 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Not 
even petitioner . . . is willing to advance the novel and surely erroneous argument that a nonnamed 
class member is a party to the class-action litigation before the class is certified.”). Before Smith, courts 
disagreed on the issue. Compare In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 593 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
absent class members are bound before class certification), and In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003) (same), and Murray v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 09-
05744CW, 2010 WL 2898291 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2010) (same), with In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up 
Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that absent class 
members are not bound before class certification), and In re Ford Motor Co., 471 F. 3d 1233, 1245 
(11th Cir. 2006) (same). 
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under the All Writs Act . . . on the theory that before certification class 
members cannot be thought to have been adequately represented.”91 
Martin Redish tried to minimize the risks posed to the plaintiff class, 
while maximizing the harms to defendants: 
[A] denial of class certification never deprives [an absent class member] 
of his individual cause of action. Indeed, denial of certification . . . will in 
no way negatively impact the individual [class member’s] ability to 
pursue her own claim. At most, future plaintiffs are denied the right to 
use of a particular procedural device [unrelated to the merits of the 
claim]. This fact clearly dilutes any conceivable negative impact on 
[absent class members’] rights to pursue their individual causes of action 
caused by the invocation of preclusion.92 
This is a rather curious argument, because it bases preclusion on the 
idea that the right that is being precluded is merely procedural and 
therefore not relevant enough. 
3.  Absent Class Members Did Not Have an Opportunity to Opt 
Out 
Another argument that may be raised against preclusion is that, 
because of the timing of the denial of class certification, class members 
are afforded no opportunity to opt out. This is particularly important if 
one considers that the right to opt out might be a constitutional due 
process guarantee,93 but is equally valid if one considers it merely a rule 
mandate with no constitutional implication.94 
 
 91. See Thorogood, 624 F.3d at 847, 854. 
 92. See Redish, supra note 34, at 10,986 (emphasis added). Redish argues, furthermore, that the 
risk of duplicative litigation is a serious problem that defendants face, and that the eventual problems 
caused to absent class members with the imposition of preclusion of class certification orders are 
“significantly overstated.” Id. at 10,985. Kevin Clermont seems to share the same perspective. 
See Clermont, supra note 80, at 216 (“The absentee does not risk losing the individual claim, but only 
the ‘right’ to bring a class action. . . . [S]ociety could defensibly conclude that absentees lose the 
‘privilege’ (and windfall returns) of bringing a class action after an adequate representative has 
unsuccessfully litigated the class certification question.”) In substantially the same vein, see Alvarez v. 
May Department Stores Co., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 892, 898–901 (Ct. App. 2006) (“[T]here is a distinction 
between using a prior ruling to bar a litigant from receiving a hearing on the merits and applying a 
prior decision to prevent a litigant from proceeding as a class representative. . . . Ultimately, applying 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not lead to an unfair result, as appellants remain free to litigate 
the merits of their personal claims.”). 
 93. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (“[D]ue process requires at 
a minimum that an absent plaintiff [in a class action seeking money judgment] be provided with an 
opportunity to remove himself from the class by executing and returning an ‘opt out’ or ‘request for 
exclusion’ form to the court.”); Steven T.O. Cottreau, Note, The Due Process Right to Opt Out of 
Class Actions, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 480, 483 (1998) (“[A]s a matter of basic procedural fairness . . . . due 
process requires courts to grant opt out rights in some cases.”). 
 94. See Mark W. Friedman, Constrained Individualism in Group Litigation: Requiring Class 
Members to Make a Good Cause Showing Before Opting Out of a Federal Class Action, 100 Yale L.J. 
745, 746 (1990). 
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The Bridgestone/Firestone court directly addressed this issue and 
determined that class members are not entitled to opt out of the 
certification phase: A class member can only opt out of an already 
certified class action.95 Moreover, the court thought, the right to opt out 
gives the member only the possibility of litigating individually, not the 
right to bring another class action.96 According to the court, a denial of a 
class certification does not infringe on this right because the putative 
class member may still bring her own individual lawsuit, even if another 
class action may not be certified.97 
Yet the court conveniently failed to recognize that if a significant 
number of class members exercise their right to opt out of a class action, 
they would be able to form a class of their own.98 Moreover, the mere fact 
that class members cannot opt out of a class certification order does not 
mean that they must be bound by it. 
4. Absent Class Members Did Not Receive Notice 
Another serious obstacle to granting preclusive effect to the class 
certification denial is the lack of adequate notice to absent class 
members.99 Before class certification, there is generally no notice to the 
absent class members. Without notice, absent class members have no 
opportunity to opt out of the class, to participate in the proceeding, or to 
control the adequacy of the representative.100 
This issue was raised by respondents and rebuffed in In re Baycol 
Products Litigation.101 The court found that the procedural due process 
requirement of adequate notice applies only when the absent class 
members would be bound to a final judgment on the merits of their 
claims, not when the class is precluded from bringing a class action, 
because the absent class members can still bring individual lawsuits.102 
This reasoning is disingenuous at best. It is common knowledge that 
many claims on their own are so small that they do not justify the 
expenses of a judicial proceeding; only collectively, through class actions, 
 
 95. 333 F.3d at 769 (“No one is entitled to opt out of the certification, a decision necessarily made 
on a class-wide . . . basis . . . .”). 
 96. Id. (“And a person who opts out [of a certified class] receives the right to go it alone, not to 
launch a competing class action.”). 
 97. Id. 
 98. For a case where members who opted out of a federal class action were forced to become part of 
a mandatory state class action, see Morgan v. Deere Credit, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 360, 366 (Tex. App. 1994). 
 99. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). 
 100. Id. 
 101. 593 F.3d 716, 725 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 102. See id.; see also In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 769 (holding that the opportunity to 
opt-out of a class action can occur only after the certification decision because before that, no class 
exists). The reasoning in Baycol Products was not much different from Martin Redish’s comment 
discussed above. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.  
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can these rights be vindicated in courts.103 The class certification order is 
as important as a decision on the merits.104 Denying class certification 
operates as a de facto unfavorable decision on the merits.105 
Quite apart from its constitutional status—which is doubtful to this 
day, especially for injunctive class actions106—adequate notice is a specific 
requirement of Rule 23 at least in class actions for damages.107 The 
Supreme Court stressed (one may even say overly stressed) its 
importance in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.108 In Eisen, the Supreme 
Court stretched the plain language of Rule 23 beyond the limits of 
reasonableness to require individual notice to all class members who can 
be identified through reasonable effort.109 The Eisen Court raised notice 
 
 103. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812–13 (1985) (ruling against an opt-in 
class action because it “would probably impede the prosecution of those class actions involving an 
aggregation of small individual claims, where a large number of claims are required to make it 
economical to bring suit”); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974) (“A critical fact in 
this litigation is that petitioner’s individual stake in the damages award he seeks is only $70. No 
competent attorney would undertake this complex antitrust action to recover so inconsequential an 
amount. Economic reality dictates that petitioner’s suit proceed as a class action or not at all.”). 
Several other cases illustrate the importance of small claims class actions in the United States. See, e.g., 
Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 
(1972); In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974); Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 
301 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). 
 104. See, e.g., Manual for Complex Litigation (Third) § 30.1 (1995) (“The decision on whether 
or not to certify a class . . . can be as important as decisions on the merits of the action . . . .”). 
 105. Much of the case law and scholarship discussing the importance of the certification order was 
developed when class certification orders were not appealable. Recognizing the importance of the 
certification order for both parties, in 1998 Rule 23(f) was finally amended to allow immediate appeal. 
Although only approved in 1998, this proposal had been floating for at least twenty-five years and was 
enacted only when the defendants realized that it was to their own benefit as well. See, e.g., 124 Cong. 
Rec. 27,860 (1978); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 61, at 58–59; see also John P. Fullam, Federal 
Rule 23—An Exercise in Utility, 38 J. Air L. & Commerce 369, 386–88 (1972); Comment, supra note 61, 
at 921–23; Hinds, supra note 61, at 840. 
 106. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 812–13 (holding that in money damages class actions, 
notice is required by due process); Eisen, 417 U.S. at 161. It is common to say that adequate notice is a 
due process guarantee only in (b)(3) class actions and is not required in (b)(1) or (b)(2) class actions 
because such classes are more cohesive and because there are no opt-out rights. See generally 
7AA Wright, Miller & Kane, supra note 11, § 1786 (stating that only adequacy of representation is 
necessary in (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions, not notice). This is a very old mistake. See Notes of 
Advisory Committee on Rules—1966 Amendment, 39 F.R.D. 69, 104–06 (1966); Arthur R. Miller, 
Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 313–15 (1973); Comment, The Importance 
of Being Adequate: Due Process Requirements in Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23, 123 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1217, 1229–30, 1234–35 (1975). It may be true that the extent of notice might be inversely 
proportional to the cohesiveness of the class, but this does not mean that notice is not constitutionally 
mandated in all class actions. See Note, Developments in the Law: Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 
1318, 1403 (1976) (stating that, after Eisen, Rule 23 displays a schizophrenic approach, requiring notice 
at any cost to protect very small pecuniary claims, but not requiring any type of notice to adjudicate 
constitutional rights). 
 107. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). 
 108. 417 U.S. at 156. 
 109. Id.; see Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 42(1)(a) (1982) (“A person is not bound by a 
judgment for or against a party who purports to represent him if: (a) [n]otice concerning the 
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to an almost sacred level, even in a case that had a large probability of 
success for the class and that would not be able to proceed individually.110 
If the reasoning of the Baycol Products court prevails, this would be 
the only circumstance in which a class judgment would adversely bind 
absent members in a class action for damages without adequate notice. 
In short, so long as the absent members will still have the abstract 
opportunity to litigate their claims individually, they will be bound by the 
certification denial, regardless of whether they received notice.111 The 
only important factor that matters is adequacy of representation. 
Adequate notice is a fundamental device to control adequacy of 
representation and is the only possibility that absent class members have 
to appeal an unfavorable class certification decision. 
5. The Issues May Not Be the Same 
Another major obstacle to issue preclusion is the general principle 
requiring that the issues be the same in order for preclusion to apply. 
Indeed, the two class action certifications must involve the same issue, 
not merely similar ones.112 While in cases where the issues are exactly or 
substantially the same there is a legitimate interest in avoiding reopening 
the matter indefinitely, in those cases in which the issues are not the 
same, there obviously can be no preclusion. 
In some circumstances, the class certification issues are exactly or 
substantially the same in the two class actions.113 In others, there is a 
significant practical disconnect between the identity of the issues.114 
 
representation was required to be given to the represented person . . . and there was no substantial 
compliance with the requirement.”); see also id. § 42 cmt. b (“Where such notice requirements, 
whether imposed by statute or order of court, have not been substantially complied with, the 
investiture of the representative is defective and the judgment for that reason is not binding on the 
persons putatively represented.”). 
 110. The vast majority of scholars have expressed dissatisfaction with Eisen. Abundant criticism 
was also directed at the Second Circuit opinion in the case. See generally 7AA Wright, Miller & 
Kane, supra note 11, § 1786, at 201–06; Kenneth W. Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 97. 
 111. See In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 593 F.3d 716, 725 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that because absent 
class members were free to pursue their claims individually, the violation of procedural due process 
requirements does not affect whether they will be bound by the court’s certification decision). 
 112. See Friedenthal, supra note 7, at 699 (“The requirement that issues be identical is construed 
strictly.”); see also Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 2.11 cmt. b (2010) (“The same-
issue requirement is relatively strict, calling for litigation and determination in the initial proceeding 
not simply of the same kind of issue concerning the appropriateness of aggregation but, rather, the 
identical issue.”). 
 113. See Piper II, 551 F.2d 213, 219 (8th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he parties and the issues in the individual 
cases will normally be of sufficient similarity that a factual determination in a fair hearing should be 
conclusive in companion cases on principles of collateral estoppel.”); Daboub v. Bell Gardens Bicycle 
Club, Inc., No. B200685, 2008 WL 4648797, at *3–4 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2008) (same issue); Alvarez 
v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 892 (Ct. App. 2006) (same issue). 
 114. See Johns v. Rozet, 141 F.R.D. 211, 214–15 (D.D.C. 1992); In re Dalkon Shield Punitive 
Damages Litig., 613 F. Supp. 1112, 1115 (E.D. Va. 1985) (disagreeing that the original order had 
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There are several instances in which the factual or legal circumstances 
involved in the certification decision are a moving target or subject to 
conflicting interpretations. The issues are clearly not the same, for 
example, when the earlier certification denial was caused by inadequate 
or atypical representation or by the lack of a common question and the 
new class action has a different representative or claim. The issues also 
are not the same whenever the first class or class claim was determined to 
be too broad and the second one is more restrictive,115 or when the 
appellate court might have refused certification simply because “the 
district court had erred in certifying the settlement class without making 
factual findings to support class certification.”116 
Indeed, the most poignant criticism of the Bridgestone/Firestone 
opinion was that the court had violated this most basic tenet of the law of 
issue preclusion. In effect, the original decision that denied class 
certification was grounded on the fact that Indiana choice-of-law rules 
dictated that the court applied the laws of the states where the car 
accidents happened and the application of the laws of all fifty states 
would be unmanageable.117 However, the court could not simply assume 
that the same manageability issues would exist under the choice-of-law 
rules of every state.118 
Some certification orders are so fact-specific that they simply cannot 
apply to a different set of facts, even in a class action filed by the same 
 
denied certification based only “on the record before it” and that there were substantial changes in 
factual and legal circumstances that justified a different decision); Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc., 
83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 620-24 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding that the denial of class certification in a previous 
case did not preclude determination of class issues in a later case because the legal issues in the two 
cases were not the same). 
 115. See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 53, at 841 (citing Yasgur v. Aegis Mortg. Corp., No. 98-CV-
121, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20989, at *8 (D. Minn. Mar. 9, 1999) (declining to apply issue preclusion 
because the definitions of the putative classes were not identical)). Denial of certification of a 
nationwide class action also does not preclude the certification of a statewide class action. See Szittai v. 
Wells Fargo Fin., Inc., No. 5:08-CV-1379, 2008 WL 4647739, at *4 (N.D. Ohio. Oct. 20, 2008) (“[T]hat 
a much broader class might not have common practices running throughout it does not speak to 
whether a more narrowly drawn class might have common practices.”). But see Murray v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., No. 09-05744CW, 2010 WL 2898291, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2010) (holding that a 
denial of certification of a nationwide class action precludes the certification of a statewide class action 
when the reason for denial is equally applicable to the narrower class). 
 116. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 146 
(3d Cir. 1998); see In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Export Antitrust Litig., 609 F. Supp. 2d 104, 106 n.5 
(D. Me. 2009) (“[T]here has been no final decision on whether a class is certifiable; the First Circuit 
left that question open.”). 
 117. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 
2002). 
 118. See Note, supra note 25, at 2037 (“In a stroke, the court purported to do what it had insisted 
earlier, in Firestone I, that the district court could not—discern and apply the laws of fifty states 
simultaneously.”). But see Moorcroft, supra note 20, at 248 (asserting that the identity of the issues lies 
in the due process analysis implicit in the manageability decision).  
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class and presenting the same cause of action. In all of the examples 
above, the change in circumstance was enough to evade preclusion. 
A more complicated matter arises when the issues of fact are 
substantially the same, but the procedural laws that the two jurisdictions 
apply to the class certification are different. For example, the class action 
law of the state in the second class action lawsuit may have a different or 
more permissive procedural rule about the prerequisites of certification 
than the law applied to the earlier class action.119 
Even if the law is written in the same way in both jurisdictions, one 
court may interpret a factual situation as complying with its laws while a 
court in another jurisdiction might not.120 This argument is consistent 
 
 119. Compare Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 732–33 (2d Cir. 1987) (“For application of 
principles of collateral estoppel, ‘the issue as to which preclusion is sought [must] be identical with the 
issue decided in the prior proceeding,’ . . . but issues are not identical when the standards governing 
them are significantly different . . . . Since the standards governing the propriety of the suit as a class 
action in the state court and the federal court differed significantly, the state court ruling did not 
decide the issue presented in this case, and there is no collateral estoppel.” (quoting Capital Tel. Co. v. 
Pattersonville Tel. Co., 436 N.E.2d 461, 463 (N.Y. 1982)), with In re Baycol Products Litig., 593 F.3d 
716, 721–23 (8th Cir. 2010) (determining that the state and federal laws were not substantially different 
and therefore involved the same issue). See J.R. Clearwater Inc. v. Ashland Chem. Co., 93 F.3d 176, 
180 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[Even when a state class action rule] is modeled on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules, 
and federal decisions are viewed as persuasive authority regarding the construction of the [state] class 
action rule, [the state] court might well exercise [its] discretion in a different manner.” (citations 
omitted)); Morgan v. Deere Credit, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 360, 365, 368–69 (Tex. App. 1994) (pointing to 
differences in state and federal class action rules, even when the language of the rules is the same, the 
state rule is patterned after Rule 23, and federal decisions are persuasive in interpreting the state rule); 
Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 31, at 45 (same). 
 120. See In re Gen. Motors, 134 F.3d at 146 (“[O]ur construction of Rule 23 and application to the 
provisional settlement class is not controlling on the Louisiana court, because it is not bound by our 
interpretation of Rule 23. Rather, the Louisiana court properly applied . . . the parallel Louisiana class 
certification rule.”); Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 2.11 cmt. b (2010) (“Same-
issue status is not present when the aggregation question in the first proceeding arose under a 
procedural rule of the rendering court and the aggregation question in the subsequent proceeding 
arises under a procedural rule—albeit, perhaps, an identically phrased rule—that need not be 
interpreted or applied in identical fashion. Issue preclusion is generally not appropriate in such a 
situation, for the court in the subsequent proceeding must have the opportunity, if it chooses, to 
construe its procedural rule differently on the aggregation question . . . .”); 18A Wright, Miller & 
Cooper, supra note 7, § 4455 (“The states remain free . . . to adopt quite different class-action 
procedures. It goes a long way indeed to assert that a refusal to certify a nationwide class under 
Rule 23 establishes a substantive right that prevents certification of a nationwide class under a 
different state procedure.”); Moorcroft, supra note 20, at 242 (“Most state class action rules are 
modeled after or are identical to Federal Rule 23, at least before its 1998 and 2003 amendments. A 
state court may, however, interpret its rule differently, even when its rule is identical to Rule 23.”); 
see also Wolff, supra note 34, at 2111–12 (“[When] a state . . . has expressly adopted a more permissive 
standard of class certification . . . . [and] the added weight of CAFA comes into play . . . . [a] federal 
court’s determination that a lawsuit is inappropriate for class treatment should be understood as a 
final disposition on the certifiability of that lawsuit—a decision with preemptive effect in any 
subsequent proceedings that seek to pursue the same class configuration. Thus, even if a state does 
embrace more permissive standards of certification, such that the attempt to refile and certify an 
identical suit in that state arguably presents a ‘different issue’ for decision than the one resolved in the 
earlier federal proceeding, the federal court may still use its injunctive powers to prevent relitigation 
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with the traditional view that issue preclusion may be avoided whenever 
the law to be applied to the facts in the second lawsuit is materially 
different from the one applied in the first.121 
The Supreme Court, in Smith v. Bayer Corp., resolved the matter in 
a rather elegant way, stating that it is essential to determine the 
“applicable legal standard” in both situations.122 Although the Court 
recognized that different jurisdictions “can and do apply identically 
worded procedural provisions in widely varying ways,” it stressed that if 
both courts “follow the same approach,” the requisite identity of issues is 
present.123 This conclusion, however, seems to contradict the first part of 
the Smith opinion, according to which an absent class member cannot be 
bound by a decision in a lawsuit that was not certified as a class action.124 
After all, if there is no preclusion without certification, it really does not 
matter if the “applicable legal standards” are the same. 
Under Smith’s “same legal standard” approach, the legal standards 
to be compared are the rules for class certification in both jurisdictions 
and whether the class at issue is certifiable under those rules. Yet one 
commentator has raised the issue that sometimes behind a certification 
 
of the broader issue that it has actually decided—namely, the certifiability of that lawsuit under the 
federal standard that CAFA has determined to be appropriate for covered cases of national 
importance.”). 
 121. See Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599–600 (1948) (“[A] change or 
development in the controlling legal principles may make that determination obsolete or erroneous, at 
least for future purposes . . . . [T]he principle of collateral estoppel . . . is designed to prevent 
repetitious lawsuits over matters which have once been decided and which have remained 
substantially static, factually and legally . . . . [C]ollateral estoppel must . . . be confined to situations 
where the matter raised in the second suit is identical in all respects with that decided in the first 
proceeding and where the controlling facts and applicable legal rules remain unchanged . . . . If the 
legal matters determined in the earlier case differ from those raised in the second case, collateral 
estoppel has no bearing on the situation . . . . [A] judicial declaration intervening between the two 
proceedings may so change the legal atmosphere as to render the rule of collateral estoppel 
inapplicable.”). Sunnen, however, may be distinguished from the certification issue because it applies 
to determinations of issues of law as applied to income tax liability in successive years. 
 122. 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2377 (2011); see Note, supra note 25, at 2037 (“[S]tate courts need not, and do 
not, observe the same standards and procedures for class certification as federal courts; state standards 
and procedures may differ sharply from the standards and procedures that Federal Rule 23 
prescribes.”). 
 123. Smith, 131 S. Ct. at 2377; see Lee v. Criterion Ins. Co., 659 F. Supp. 813, 822–23 (S.D. Ga. 
1987) (“[A] party cannot avoid the preclusive effect of a denial of class certification rendered by a 
federal court in this jurisdiction by filing suit against the same party in Georgia state court and 
pointing to largely illusory differences between statutes that are designed for essentially identical 
purposes.”); Moorcroft, supra note 20, at 243 (“When state class action rules are interpreted 
substantially similarly to the federal class action rule, a court may properly issue an injunction, but 
only to the narrow extent that the state rules are similar.”). 
 124. See supra Part III.C.2. (discussing the contradiction and unfairness of giving preclusive effect 
to a decision in which the representative status was denied); see Smith, 131 S. Ct. at 2380 (“Neither a 
proposed class action nor a rejected class action may bind nonparties.”).  
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decision lies a constitutional argument.125 In such circumstances, there 
would be the requisite identity of legal issues.126 
One may argue that whether the laws are exactly the same, similar, 
or different should not be controlling on whether issue preclusion is 
applicable to class certification orders. When an adequate class 
representative brings a class action in one jurisdiction, it accepts that its 
procedural, substantive, and choice-of-law rules will be applied to the 
case to the exclusion of all others. The same way that a plaintiff does not 
have the right to bring the same lawsuit in another state, arguing that the 
substantive laws of the second jurisdiction are more favorable, she 
cannot bring the same class action lawsuit arguing that the procedural 
rules are not the same. This objection, however, is not convincing. In 
much the same way that different jurisdictions might have different 
statute-of-limitation rules, it seems clear that different jurisdictions might 
have different scopes for class actions and might allow them in different 
situations. If one jurisdiction does not allow a certain set of facts to be 
treated collectively for purposes of adjudication, the case must be 
dismissed without prejudice to the class’s substantive right, while other 
jurisdictions might choose to treat the case collectively.127 
The identity of legal issues is more likely to be present when the two 
class actions are brought in the same jurisdiction (that is, in the same 
state or in the federal courts).128 However, these cases understandably 
will be rare in practice because the class naturally will search for another 
opportunity in a different judicial system. Moreover, the issues of fact 
might still be different or the proposed class might be narrower.129 In 
addition, even when the issues of law and fact are the same, there are still 
several other policy and doctrinal reasons not to allow preclusion of class 
certification orders. 
 
 125. See Moorcroft, supra note 20, at 243–48 (2004) (“Implicit in many denials of certification is a 
recognition that any decision rendered by class adjudication would not be entitled to enforcement 
under the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses. . . . A denial of certification with 
constitutional underpinnings necessarily involves the same issues as later certification decisions, 
making the denial proper for injunctive relief regardless of how liberally a state would interpret its 
own class action requirements.”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. A similar case was presented in Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 143 (1988). 
There, a plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed in one jurisdiction for forum non conveniens. Id. at 143. 
That decision had no preclusion effect in a lawsuit brought in another jurisdiction because the second 
jurisdiction might apply a different forum non conveniens standard. Id. at 148–49. 
 128. See Clermont, supra note 80, at 205 (stating that the identity of legal issues is more readily 
available between courts in the same system, but could also arise between federal and state courts or 
between courts of different states). 
 129. See, e.g., Bufil v. Dollar Fin. Group, Inc. 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804 (Ct. App. 2008) (stating that the 
class and the claim in the second class action were narrower than in the first class action and, therefore, 
that the issues of predominance that caused the previous certification denial were not the same). 
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6. The Certification Order Is Discretionary 
Another important argument against issue preclusion of a class 
certification denial is the discretionary character of the certification 
decision.130 Some courts have been justifiably hesitant to afford preclusive 
effect in such a circumstance.131 
As the Bridgestone/Firestone case makes clear, while some courts 
may not consider that it is worthwhile to proceed on a class wide basis, 
others “are free to decide for themselves how much effort to invest in 
[complex litigation].”132 In that specific case, however, the court 
ultimately concluded that the denial of certification in a prior class action 
“was based not simply on a belief that managing national classes would 
consume too much of a federal court’s limited supply of time; it also was 
based on a conclusion that certification of national classes would 
compromise the legitimate interests of defendants.”133 
7. Class Certification Orders Are Not Necessary or Essential to the 
Judgment 
Another obstacle against the application of issue preclusion of a 
certification order is that the certification decision is not “necessary or 
essential” to the final decision on the merits. 
According to the traditional doctrine, issue preclusion is applicable 
only if the decision was essential to the judgment. Decisions that were 
not a “necessary step” or essential to the final judgment have no binding 
effect. The rationale for this exclusion is that the parties and the court do 
not give exhaustive attention to incidental issues. Moreover, these issues, 
even though actively asserted, litigated, and decided, are not appealable, 
particularly if decided in favor of the party who ultimately prevailed on 
the merits. In addition, making these merely incidental decisions binding 
in future litigation would encourage parties to litigate exhaustively about 
every small controversy, regardless of its importance to the merits of the 
 
 130. See 7AA Wright, Miller & Kane, supra note 11, § 1785, at 370–71 (“The trial court has 
broad discretion in deciding whether to certify a class action and its decision will be reversed only if an 
abuse of discretion is shown.”). 
 131. See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 146 
n.7 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting with approval J.R. Clearwater v. Ashland Chem. Co., 93 F.3d 176, 180 (5th 
Cir. 1996)); J.R. Clearwater Inc., 93 F.3d at 180 (“[T]he wide discretion inherent in the decision as to 
whether or not to certify a class dictates that each court—or at least each jurisdiction—be free to make 
its own determination in this regard.”); Piper II, 551 F.2d 213, 217 (8th Cir. 1977) (“Discretionary 
orders generally are not suitable for treatment under the collateral order doctrine.”); see also Note, 
supra note 25, at 2037 (stating that different courts may have different positions on the “desirability” 
of a class action). 
 132. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(“[A]dvice designed to ward off what a federal court deems an unproductive investment of judicial 
time does not create a ‘judgment’ that forbids any state tribunal to make the effort.”). 
 133. Id. at 768. 
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case.134 A class certification order is a procedural, interlocutory, and 
merely incidental decision that dismisses the proceeding without 
reaching its merits. 
Even though it is true that the certification decision cannot be 
considered a “necessary step” or essential to the final decision on the 
merits, it is such an important decision in the context of class action 
litigation that one can hardly say that the parties or the court did not give 
exhaustive attention to it.135 The argument about non-appealability also 
fails because not only is the certification decision immediately 
appealable,136 even if decided in favor of the prevailing party, the 
certification order can be appealed. 
8. Asymmetry of Results 
In order to test the fairness of a procedural solution, it is helpful to 
put it in the proper context and reverse the situation. If the issue 
preclusion of an order denying class certification is to be fair, an order 
granting such certification should also preclude issues to the same extent 
in the same circumstances. Any interpretation that in practice has a 
disparate impact on the parties is illegitimate and should be avoided.137 
Suppose, then, that a class action is duly certified but the lawsuit is 
later dismissed without prejudice for reasons unrelated to the 
certification order. If another class representative brings the same class 
action again in another court, would the prior certification order 
preclude relitigation of the issues previously decided? Will the second 
court and the defendant be bound by the previous certification decision? 
Whatever the rule proposed for an order denying class certification, it 
should be the same as the order granting it. Otherwise, the plaintiffs will 
be systematically disadvantaged.138 
Not all commentators agree with this symmetrical approach. Some 
are perfectly content with different preclusion rules for orders granting 
and denying class certification. According to Joseph McLaughlin, for 
 
 134. See Casad & Clermont, supra note 4, at 127–29, 138–39; Friedenthal, supra note 7, at 711–12 
(citing Assoc. of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Wilson v. 
Wilson, 607 P.2d 539 (Mont. 1980)). 
 135. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 136. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) (“A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or 
denying class-action certification . . . .”). Rule 23(f) was adopted in 1998 to allow for permissive 
interlocutory appeals of class certification orders, after decades of public debate. See 124 Cong. Rec. 
27,859 (1978); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 61, at 58–59; Comment, supra note 61, at 921–23; 
Hinds, supra note 61, at 840; see also U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18 
(1994). 
 137. The irony of demanding symmetry of results in an area of law that has not been based on 
mutuality for several decades was addressed previously. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 138. This situation is to be distinguished from the cases where a class is certified and the class 
action lawsuit is ultimately decided on the merits. In such situation, the class certification order is 
precluded and a class member or the defendant cannot later challenge certification. 
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example, whatever the merits of a rule denying issue preclusion to an 
order granting class certification, “it clearly should not apply to orders 
denying certification, since that would enable plaintiffs, by the simple 
expedient of discontinuing, to ‘shop around’ indefinitely until they found 
a forum that would grant them certification.”139 
Unfortunately, while McLaughlin’s theory attempts to protect the 
interests of defendants, it completely disregards the interests of the 
plaintiff class. The same fears and risks of forum shopping exist on the 
part of the defendant, who could easily manipulate procedure to “shop” 
for a weaker or more disorganized class action counsel and obtain an 
early order denying class certification before the plaintiff class could 
muster its force to assemble a more powerful offensive.140 
As a matter of fact, quite to the contrary, there are plenty of 
additional reasons, and none of the insurmountable problems, to allow 
preclusion of an order granting but not to one denying class certification. 
Most of the arguments raised against certification preclusion apply only 
to absent class members who are nonparties to the litigation; they do not 
apply to a defendant that had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in 
person the class certification issue and lost. Yet to this day, no court or 
scholar has made such an argument. 
In theory at least, one may say that the second court is bound by a 
previous court order granting certification. However, in practice, there is 
no such preclusion for the simple fact that the certification order does 
not have preclusive effect even within the same class proceeding. In 
Morgan v. Deere Credit, Inc., for example, a party wanted issue 
preclusive effect applied to an order certifying an opt-out class action.141 
More specifically, the defendant class in a state court mandatory class 
action argued that the plaintiff could not relitigate the class certification 
because a federal court had already decided that the same class was to be 
certified as an opt-out class action. According to the defendant class, the 
issue preclusive effect of the prior federal court class certification 
required the state court of the second lawsuit to certify the second class 
action as an opt-out class action as well.142 
Predictably enough, the federal court certification order was denied 
preclusive effect because “[a] class certification order cannot usually be 
 
 139. See McLaughlin, supra note 40, § 3:15 (emphasis added) (commenting on In re Livaditis, 
132 B.R. 897, 903 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991); In re Livaditis, 122 B.R. 330, 334–35 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) 
(refusing to apply issue preclusion to an order granting class certification). 
 140. See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 2.11 cmt. c (2010) (“The subsequent 
court should guard against the possibility of strategic jockeying by defendants to obtain a favorable 
determination of the aggregation question in a proceeding in which the lawyers for claimants operate 
under structural conflicts of interest with a significant potential to skew systematically their incentive 
to press vigorously the use of aggregation.”). 
 141. 889 S.W.2d 360, 366 (Tex. App. 1994). 
 142. Id. at 366–67.  
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characterized as final or irrevocable because it is subject to 
redetermination as the litigation progresses.”143 It is well settled that even 
the court that originally issued that order may at any time modify it or 
even decertify the class altogether.144 It could not be otherwise: If a class 
certification order proves wrong as the litigation develops, there is no 
point in forcing class status on a litigation that does not have it. 
The equality standard clearly shows that any rule that would preclude 
certification denials but not certification grants would systematically 
affect only the plaintiff class and therefore is extremely unfair. So, a 
previous decision denying class certification should be binding on a second 
court only to the same extent that a previous decision granting certification 
would also be binding. Since there can be no binding effect to orders 
granting certification, orders denying certification should have no 
binding effect either. Yet most commentators and courts that have 
addressed the issue focus only on the preclusive effect of class certification 
denial, not on class certification grants.145 
9. Summary 
There are some policy considerations in favor of giving a certain 
level of repose to a decision denying class certification, but there also are 
several policy and doctrinal considerations against giving preclusive 
effect to such a decision. 
It seems an exaggeration to say that a neutral observer, without 
political preferences or biases, would not be able to choose between 
these two options. Indeed, according to Kevin Clermont, “[i]f a court 
eyed these [options] without a proplaintiff or prodefendant bias, and 
without any unauthorized policy bias that favors or disfavors class 
actions, the court could not say with definitiveness which side has the 
stronger argument.”146 The exercise itself seems futile and of little 
application to any legal question, as there are no neutral observers and 
there are no neutral legal rules, but if there were, it seems that the 
 
 143. Id. at 367 (“[T]he class certification issue is not procedurally definite; rather, it is subject to 
change as provided in the rules.”). The court also reasoned that the issues were not identical because 
even identical class action rules sometimes are applied differently in the state court. Id. at 368–69. 
 144. See 7AAWright, Miller & Kane, supra note 11, § 1785.4, at 480–83 (“Courts have modified 
or decertified classes at the outset of pretrial, the completion of discovery, after summary judgment in 
favor of plaintiff class’s injunctive claims, but before awarding damages, at the close of plaintiff class’s 
case-in-chief, and at the completion of the trial on the merits. The reasons given by the courts for 
altering certification orders are similarly diffuse and have included lack of numerosity, lack of 
commonality, the inadequacy of the named plaintiffs as class representatives, inadequacy of counsel 
and a lack of manageability.”). 
 145. An example of the one-sided view of the subject is in the title and the content of J. Russell 
Jackson, Preclusive Effect of Class Certification Denial, Nat’l L.J., Aug. 16, 2010 (discussing only the 
preclusive effect of class certification denial). 
 146. See Clermont, supra note 80, at 217. 
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overwhelming force of the argument would disfavor application of issue 
preclusion to class certification orders. 
I also disagree with those commentators who consider the best 
solution from a policy perspective to be preclusion of the class 
certification denial issue, and that the only obstacles are mere technical 
details of the issue preclusion doctrine.147 
The conflict between the need for repose and the protection of 
nonparties (absent class members) is indeed a seemingly intractable 
problem of policy, but it need not be, as long as we avoid the temptation 
to adopt extreme positions. We should avoid any technical application of 
the doctrine of issue preclusion and adapt the need of repose to the 
peculiarities of class action litigation. Ultimately, as with anything in law 
and in procedure, the solution comes down to a political choice between 
equally reasonable rules, with pros and cons on both sides. Legal 
doctrine or policy alone is not enough to solve this conundrum, which 
demands a much more flexible and less formalistic approach. 
IV.  The Search for a Solution 
As this Article makes abundantly clear, many policy and doctrinal 
hurdles make it impossible and unwise to give strict preclusive effect to 
an order denying class certification. The courts that decided to do so had 
to ignore or bypass the traditional requirements of issue preclusion and, 
despite language to the contrary, they did not apply the traditional issue 
preclusion doctrine but instead created a new rule, applying the old 
canons recklessly to the needs and peculiarities of class action litigation. 
Despite the fact that the issue preclusion doctrine is ill suited to the 
class certification context, some courts and commentators have 
recognized that, for practical reasons discussed above, a previous class 
certification decision must have at least “some effect” in future courts or 
it risks making a mockery of the legal system. Such a broad and abstract 
rule is difficult to state in terms of issue preclusion or any other 
traditional procedural device available to courts. Some proposals are 
very creative but fail to yield a workable solution. Below I discuss the 
proposals to address the issue. 
 
 147. See Wasserman, supra note 53, at 839 (“Examined solely as a policy matter, one might expect 
that a denial of class certification would preclude a successive class action filed on behalf of the same 
class. . . . Even though it appears that the policies underlying preclusion law might well be served by a 
decision to preclude a successive class action, in fact, the hurdle posed by issue preclusion doctrine to 
successive class actions is more illusory than real.”); see also Piper II, 551 F.2d 213, 219 (8th Cir. 1977) 
(refusing to apply collateral estoppel to a class action determination where a plaintiff was involved in 
multidistrict litigation, even while acknowledging that strong arguments may be made in support of 
collateral estoppel); 18A Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 7, § 4455 at 457–58 (“Some 
practitioners believe there is a serious problem with repeated efforts to persuade successive courts to 
certify the same ill-advised class. . . . But substantial doctrinal obstacles make preclusion 
difficult . . . .”). 
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A. Discretion to Assert Preclusive Effect to a Court’s Own 
Certification Orders 
Concern for the risk of duplicative class action litigation has led the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to study the situation and make a 
proposal to amend Rule 23.148 The Committee acknowledged that the 
preclusion doctrine poses “several obstacles” to the preclusion of 
certification orders,149 but decided to bypass decades of experience with 
preclusion law and proposed adding a new subdivision (c)(1)(D) to 
Rule 23. The proposed subdivision reads: 
A court that refuses to certify—or decertifies—a class for failure to 
satisfy the prerequisites of Rule 23(a)(1) or (2), or for failure to satisfy 
the standards of Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3), may direct that no other 
court may certify a substantially similar class to pursue substantially 
similar claims, issues, or defenses unless a difference of law or change 
of fact creates a new certification issue.150 
Such a proposal, allowing the court that denied class certification to 
give preclusive effect to its own order, goes directly against preclusion 
practice and doctrine, and against every single objection that has been 
discussed in this Article so far. It binds absent class members, nonparties 
that did not receive notice or an opportunity to opt out, to a decision that 
was not necessary or final and that might involve different legal or 
factual issues, legal standards, or discretionary considerations.151 
Moreover, this measure is asymmetrical because it gives preclusive effect 
only to orders that refuse to certify a class action, not to those that grant 
certification.152 
The proposed rule imposes three restrictions in order to address 
some of the above mentioned concerns. First, it limits the preclusive 
effect to decisions denying certification based on lack of numerosity or 
commonality or on the standards of Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3), therein 
including decisions on the important but elusive prerequisites of 
superiority and predominance. Contrary to what the Advisory 
Committee’s proposal tries to convey, commonality, superiority, and 
predominance are in the eye of the beholder. What is superior and 
predominant to one court may not be to another, including courts in the 
 
 148. See Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 31, at 44. 
 149. Id. (“Ordinary res judicata traditions . . . pose several obstacles. These obstacles, grounded in 
traditional individual litigation, may forestall judicial development of ‘common-law’ certification 
preclusion. [But,] [c]ontemporary class-action litigation presents new challenges. Responding to these 
challenges requires elaboration of res judicata theory to incorporate the conceptual needs and 
opportunities of class actions.”); see Redish, supra note 34, at 10,985 (arguing that, in the class action 
context, normal rules of preclusion must be modified and that traditional forms of preclusion will be 
ineffective in addressing this problem; Redish, however, does not address any of the obstacles). 
 150. Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 31, at 40. 
 151. See supra Part III.C.  
 152. See supra Part III.C.8.  
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same hierarchy, as can be attested by the several class certification orders 
that recently have been reversed.153 
The second limitation is that preclusion would be restricted to the 
cases where the court that refuses certification “directs” that no other 
court may certify a substantially similar class. In other words, it is for the 
rendering court, on its discretion, to dictate whether there will be 
preclusion of its own decision of denial of class certification. This 
unprecedented device seems to assume that the rendering court is 
equipped to know when its own decision deserves to be considered the 
last word on the subject and when the issues were not fully considered or 
otherwise deserve to be revisited by another court.154 However, not only 
is the rendering court not in the best position to pass a decision on the 
preclusion of its own decision,155 it is unlikely that a court will consider 
that the same issue it took a couple of years to resolve deserves 
subsequent discussion in another court. 
The third limitation is that the possibility of relitigating the 
certification issue is open whenever a difference of law or a change of 
fact creates a new certification issue.156 In principle, this qualification is 
technically unnecessary because preclusion only attaches if there is 
identity of issues.157 However, since the proposal makes revolutionary 
changes to the doctrine of issue preclusion, it was probably advisable to 
make this limitation explicit. 
Although the proposed rule was to amend the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to give preclusive effect to federal court decisions, the 
comments state that the same policies would have applied when a class 
action in federal court involved the same certification issues previously 
decided in state court.158 According to the comments, the federal court 
should “consider carefully the reasons that led the state court to refuse 
certification” with the objective of protecting itself against repetitive 
litigation of the same certification issue.159 
Whatever the qualifications or limitations, the Advisory Committee 
proposal goes directly against decades of experience with the doctrine of 
 
 153. For an example, see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), where the district 
court and the Ninth Circuit certified a nationwide class of 1.5 million female Wal-Mart employees 
allegedly discriminated against, but the Supreme Court denied certification for lack of commonality. 
 154. See Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 31, at 44 (mentioning “a host of possible 
considerations” and giving examples). 
 155. But see Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 
717, 765 (2005) (proposing allowing the trial court to “place constraints upon the preclusive effect of 
its own judgment that are calibrated to the needs of a particular class proceeding.”). 
 156. See Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 31, at 45 (explaining that more information about 
the facts may mean a change in the facts). 
 157. See supra Part III.C.5. 
 158. See Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 31, at 45. 
 159. Id. 
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issue preclusion. Therefore, although the three limitations and 
exceptions discussed above are so broad as to substantially swallow the 
rule, the proposal was ill advised for the reasons already discussed.160 
Moreover, as shown above, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the 
notion that the mere fear of repetitive litigation of similar class action 
issues trumps the rule against nonparty preclusion.161 
B. Law of the Case and Stare Decisis of the Class Certification 
Order 
An interesting suggestion to address the problem is proposed in the 
Wright, Miller, and Cooper Federal Practice and Procedure treatise. The 
idea is to adopt “law-of-the-case concepts within the contours of an 
individual [class] suit, and stare decisis as between separate [class] 
suits.”162 Unfortunately, the authors do not elaborate on their proposal 
beyond this general, cryptic comment. Because complex problems 
generally are not simplified by giving them new labels, it is incumbent on 
us to try to understand the practical operation of such a proposal. 
Generally, under the law-of-the-case doctrine, when an issue is 
decided in a particular case, the same parties cannot relitigate the same 
issue in the same proceeding.163 Stare decisis, on the other hand, protects 
the stability of decisions in future cases and is applicable to any party, not 
necessarily the same parties of the proceeding.164 More important, 
though, is what law of the case and stare decisis have in common: 
exceptions.165 This is unlike the principle of res judicata, which as a rule is 
not subject to departure.166 Finally, unlike issue preclusion, which 
requires an issue to be “necessary to the judgment,” law of the case may 
 
 160. See supra Part III.C.  
 161. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2381 (2011) (citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 901 
(2008)); see Taylor, 553 U.S. at 883 (“[B]ecause the number of plaintiffs in public-law cases is 
potentially limitless, it is theoretically possible for several persons to coordinate a series of vexatious 
repetitive lawsuits. But this risk does not justify departing from the usual nonparty preclusion rules.”). 
 162. See 18A Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 7, § 4455. 
 163. See Casad & Clermont, supra note 4, at 16–17; 18B Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 7, 
§ 4478. 
 164. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2641 (2011) (stating that the doctrine of 
stare decisis aims to ensure the goals of stability and predictability); In re Laudy’s Will, 55 N.E. 914, 
915–16 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1900) (“The rule of res adjudicata controls the parties, while that of stare 
decisis guides the courts.”). 
 165. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (“[A]ny order or other decision . . . that adjudicates fewer than all the 
claims . . . may be revised at any time before the entry of a [final] judgment . . . .”); Greene v. Rothschild, 
414 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Wash. 1966) (en banc) (“Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the court is not obliged 
to perpetuate its own errors. . . . We see no reason why this principle should not apply where the 
allegedly erroneous decision is one which was rendered on a prior appeal of the same case.”). 
 166. See United States v. U.S. Smelting Ref. & Mining Co., 339 U.S. 186, 199 (1950) (contrasting 
res judicata, “a uniform rule,” with law of the case, “a discretionary rule”); Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews 
& Co., 682 F.2d 830, 833 (9th Cir. 1982) (“The law of the case principle is analogous to, but less 
absolute a bar than, res judicata.”). 
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be applied to any issue.167 The differentiations above are relevant because 
the same issue may be subject to preclusion through law of the case, stare 
decisis, or issue preclusion.168 
As a principle of adherence to legal precedents, stare decisis does 
not apply to decisions on issues of fact, the central scope of issue 
preclusion. Of course, both stare decisis and issue preclusion apply to the 
application of the law to issues of fact.169 The second court is bound only 
by the legal precedent contained in the holding, not by the decisions 
regarding the facts of the case. Therefore, the second court still must 
hear all the evidence and factual arguments from scratch and is free to 
reach a different conclusion. Naturally, this situation means that there 
will be a new opportunity for performing discovery in the second class 
action. Further, after deciding the questions of fact, the second court will 
then have the opportunity to distinguish the facts of the case and avoid 
the direct application of the precedent.170 
Whatever the decision on the prior class action lawsuit, the court in 
the second class action not only is not strictly bound by its precedent 
(especially if emanated from a court of a different hierarchy), but also 
the second court may have the opportunity to manipulate the facts to 
avoid its application. This is a double guarantee to preserve the second 
court’s freedom to decide the issues anew.171 For example, if the first class 
action was not certified because the class was not sufficiently numerous, 
the second court, after further extensive discovery, may find out that the 
class was larger than the prior court originally determined. Or the second 
court may define the class differently, magnifying its size to conform to 
the rule requirement. If the reason for noncertification was lack of 
manageability, the second court might construct the facts differently and 
distinguish them from the precedent established in the prior class action 
 
 167. Compare Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (“Under collateral estoppel, once a court 
has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of 
the issue . . . .”), with State v. Loveless, 150 P.2d 1015, 1016 (Nev. 1944) (holding that adjudication of 
any issue is the law of the case in any subsequent appeals). 
 168. See, e.g., 18B Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 7, § 4478.5, at 814 (“[A]ny issue suitable 
for disposition under the law of the case is likely to be indistinguishable for stare decisis purposes.”). 
 169. See Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 814 F.2d 358, 367–68 (7th Cir. 
1987) (refusing to allow an opt-out class member to assert offensive nonmutual issue preclusion 
against the defendant, but applying the doctrine of stare decisis and stating that “only the gravest 
reasons should lead the court in the opt-out [individual] suit to come to a conclusion that departs from 
that in the [prior] class suit”).  
 170. See id. at 368 (“We therefore approach the merits of this case with a strong presumption in 
favor of the Fourth Circuit’s disposition [in the prior class action]. The presumption does not eliminate 
the need for independent analysis, but it does mean that doubts should be resolved in favor of the 
Fourth Circuit’s disposition [in the prior class action].”). 
 171. See id. 
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lawsuit. In any event, the Supreme Court has already made it clear that 
sometimes stare decisis is the only weapon against repetitive litigation.172 
The traditional principles of law of the case are not useful to resolve 
the issue, because its application is traditionally limited to within a single 
case,173 whereas the problem we are discussing here is whether a second 
court is bound by a previous court’s decision denying certification. In its 
traditional formulation, the law-of-the-case doctrine requires that, once a 
court decides an issue, and that issue is not subject to reexamination, the 
court may not review the disposition of that issue in the same 
proceeding.174 Its main purpose is to encourage cases to move forward by 
avoiding the continuous discussion of issues that have been settled.175 
With some creativity, however, one might extrapolate this 
traditional “same case” usage and suggest the application of a modified 
“law of the case” in other proceedings and in other courts. This is not a 
far-fetched proposal, since law of the case has been applied by nonparties 
in a similar, albeit more limited, way than nonmutual issue preclusion.176 
If applicable, law of the case might indeed be a slightly better 
solution than stare decisis. One limitation is that it is controversial to 
apply law of the case to decisions that are discretionary in nature, such as 
class certification.177 
 
 172. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 883 (2008) (“[B]ecause the number of plaintiffs in public-
law cases is potentially limitless, it is theoretically possible for several persons to coordinate a series of 
vexatious repetitive lawsuits. But this risk does not justify departing from the usual nonparty 
preclusion rules. Stare decisis will allow courts to dispose of repetitive suits in the same circuit, and 
even when stare decisis is not dispositive, the human inclination not to waste money should discourage 
suits based on claims or issues already decided.”).  
 173. See Casad & Clermont, supra note 4, at 16 (“[Law of the case] does not apply beyond the 
parties to the case in which the ruling was rendered. Indeed, the ruling is binding as the law of the case 
only during the later conduct of the very case in which the ruling was made, that is, within the context 
of the initial action. It will not bind the parties, or anyone else, in later proceedings that are not part of 
the same case.”); 18B Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 7, § 4478, at 637–39 (“Law-of-the-case 
rules have developed to maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided 
during the course of a single continuing lawsuit. They do not apply between separate actions.”). 
 174. See Casad & Clermont, supra note 4, at 16. 
 175. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816 (1988) (“[Law of the case] 
promotes the finality and efficiency of the judicial process by ‘protecting against the agitation of 
settled issues.’” (quoting 1B James W. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.404[1] (1984))). 
 176. See 18B Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 7, § 4478.5 at 809–10 (“The most basic 
proposition is that law of the case ordinarily arises within a single case; a party to one action is not 
bound by rulings made in a separate action. But just as nonmutual preclusion has won widespread 
acceptance, so a new party or a co-party may be entitled to invoke law-of-the-case principles against a 
party who lost an earlier ruling.”). 
 177. Compare Joan Steinman, Law of the Case: A Judicial Puzzle in Consolidated and Transferred 
Cases and in Multidistrict Litigation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 595, 609 (1987) (“Law of the case is not so 
clearly applicable, however, when a litigant seeks reconsideration of a discretionary matter.”), with 
Allan D. Vestal, Law of the Case: Single-Suit Preclusion, 12 Utah L. Rev. 1, 26–27 (1967) (considering 
that matters of discretion deserve a stronger application of the law of the case). The discretionary 
nature of class certification orders has been discussed earlier in this Article. See supra Part III.C.6. 
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Although “law-of-the-case . . . does not command obedience,” it 
makes sense for future courts to consider that “the carefully considered 
views of another court are likely to have some persuasive force.”178 
Treating certification decisions of prior courts as the law of the case will 
make prior rulings highly persuasive, but will not strictly bind future 
courts in the same way as if the decisions were afforded the status of 
issue preclusion. Law of the case would not only advance the goal of 
judicial economy but would leave room for reconsideration and fairness 
to all parties, especially, but not only, if new evidence is presented. 
The decision to reconsider a prior decision is left to the discretion of 
the court, but most courts view the law of the case with much constraint, 
particularly in times of crowded dockets like ours.179 Although the power 
to review a prior decision is broad, generally courts will be reluctant to 
reconsider unless there is a supervening change in the law, presentation 
of new evidence, or a need to correct a clear error or prevent a manifest 
injustice.180 
In any event, what makes the proposal to use principles of law of the 
case or stare decisis unattractive is that if they are not strictly interpreted, 
as suggested above, and do not give ample opportunity for 
reconsideration, the end result might be to bind the absent class in much 
the same way that issue preclusion does. The proposal is simply the same 
rule with a different name and, worse, without the same traditional 
constraints. Because of the absence of such constraints, the principles of 
law of the case or stare decisis, although in principle much weaker, in 
practice may have a much tougher effect than preclusion itself. 
 
 178. 18B Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 7, § 4478.4, at 770 (discussing the application of 
the law-of-the-case doctrine in different courts, when a case moves from one court to another by 
transfer, removal, remand, etc.). Wright, Miller, and Cooper also add that “[t]he same dispute may 
instead be framed in formally separate actions, either simultaneously or sequentially, in circumstances 
that do not support claim preclusion or issue preclusion.” Id.; see Steinman, supra note 177, at 622–26, 
656–62 (discussing the law-of-the-case doctrine in the context of consolidation and transfer). For an 
earlier such discussion, see Vestal, supra note 177, at 21–26. 
 179. See 18B Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 7, § 4478.4.  
 180. See, e.g., White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 431–32 (5th Cir. 1967) (“While the ‘law of the case’ 
doctrine is not an inexorable command, a decision of a legal issue or issues by an appellate court 
establishes the ‘law of the case’ and must be followed in all subsequent proceedings in the same case in 
the trial court or on a later appeal in the appellate court, unless the evidence on a subsequent trial was 
substantially different, controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of the law applicable 
to such issues, or the decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.”); see also 
18B Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 7, § 4478 (analyzing each of these elements). On the other 
hand, Robert Casad and Kevin Clermont criticize a rigid application of the law of the case and 
question “whether the interests of economy of judicial effort served by the doctrine [of the law of the 
case] are generally of such importance as to justify holding parties to erroneous rulings that could still 
be corrected within the framework of the same case.” Casad & Clermont, supra note 4, at 16. 
Therefore, “courts have not applied it with as much rigor and consistency as they have shown in 
connection with res judicata.” Id.  
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As we have seen, binding absent class members to a class certification 
order goes against all the criticisms raised in the previous Subpart: 
binding a nonparty, who did not receive notice or opportunity to opt out, 
to a decision that was not necessary nor final and might involve different 
legal or factual issues, legal standards, or discretionary considerations.181 
Moreover, this measure is asymmetrical because it gives preclusive effect 
only to orders that refuse to certify a class action, not to those that grant 
certification.182 
However, if applied in a modified format, with broad flexibility and 
ample opportunity for reconsideration, these principles might prove 
relevant in practice. After all, if giving preclusive effect to the prior 
certification order might be unfair to the class, not giving any effect 
whatsoever could also prove counterproductive and extremely unfair to 
the defendants, allowing the plaintiff class in effect to bring the same 
class action, raising the same claims on behalf of the same class and 
against the same defendant, in fifty-one jurisdictions: one in each state 
and one in federal court. The class plaintiff is limited only by the 
financial capacity of the class counsel and the rules of personal 
jurisdiction (which is not a negligible limitation). 
Yet concern over this proposal is legitimate, especially considering 
that courts have interpreted the principles of law of the case in disparate 
ways, with some courts having a “relatively lax attitude,” some taking a 
“tougher stance,” and others “still more stringent.”183 
C. Rebuttable Presumption Against Relitigation of the Class 
Certification Order 
On substantively the same lines as the Federal Practice and 
Procedure treatise,184 the ALI’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate 
Litigation gave a firm, albeit minor, step in the right direction when it 
proposed that “[a] judicial decision to deny aggregate treatment for a 
common issue or for related claims by way of a class action should raise a 
rebuttable presumption against the same aggregate treatment in other 
courts as a matter of comity.”185 
 
 181. See supra Part III.C.  
 182. See supra Part III.C.8. 
 183. Steinman, supra note 177, at 614–15, 617–18 (“[N]o monolithic nation-wide doctrine 
prevails.”); see Vestal, supra note 177, at 2–4 (discussing conflicting positions between state and within 
the same state). 
 184. See supra Part IV.B.  
 185. Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 2.11, at 178 (2010); see Note, supra 
note 25, at 2038 (“States could partially alleviate the problem by adopting incremental reforms, such 
as class action rules that direct judges to take note of prior denials of certification by other courts.”). 
The Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation proposed several other innovations, one of which is 
the novel concept of the indivisibility of the class action remedy (or of the class substantive right) as a 
criterion to determine the right to opt out. See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation 
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Exactly as was done by the Federal Practice and Procedure 
treatise,186 this proposal too abandons the idea of preclusion altogether, 
because of the difficulties related to its application to class certification 
orders.187 The difference is that, instead of applying the law of the case or 
stare decisis, it adopts the standard of comity.188 This is a healthy 
departure from the previous versions of the Principles, which not only 
advocated the traditional issue preclusion effect to the previous decision 
denying certification, but also stated that whenever the decision did not 
qualify for preclusive effect, there should be a rebuttable presumption 
against certification as a matter of comity.189 The original proposal, 
therefore, offered a double-kill approach for the plaintiff class: First, the 
court should try to apply traditional rules of issue preclusion. In case they 
do not apply, still the relitigation of the same issue must be preempted by 
a rebuttable presumption. 
However, what the ALI proposal gave with one hand, it took away 
with the other. The comments stated that if the same discussion arises in 
another jurisdiction, the mere fact that the law was different (even if 
stated in exactly the same language and interpreted exactly the same 
way) is enough to avoid the application of issue preclusion because it 
would be a different legal issue.190 The issue preclusion effect is limited to 
situations that involve the exact same legal issue, such as a question of 
federal due process. Still, when the issues are different, and issue 
preclusion cannot apply, comity and rebuttable presumption would 
govern.191 
 
§ 2.04, at 118–29 (2010); see also Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil—A Model for Civil Law 
Countries, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 311, 350–54 (2003) (discussing the indivisibility of class claims from a 
comparative perspective and suggesting that “[r]ecognition of the concept of indivisible class claims 
would be an important evolution in American class action law. . . . [F]or example, to decide whether 
there should be a right to ‘opt out’ of the class or not.”). 
 186. See supra Part IV.B.  
 187. See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 2.11 cmt. b, at 179–80 (2010). This 
comment, entitled “Comity in Lieu of Preclusion,” discusses the several “difficulties” of using 
preclusion with respect to a denial of class certification. But see Clermont, supra note 80, at 213–16 
(criticizing the ALI rejection of nonparty preclusion on due process grounds). 
 188. See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 2.11 cmt. b, at 179 (2010) (“The basis 
for this presumption [against class certification] is not preclusion but, rather, comity: the authority of 
the subsequent court to exercise discretion in its aggregation decision so as to avoid, insofar as is 
possible, unnecessary friction between judicial systems.”).  
 189. See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 2.11, at 212 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 
2008) (“Preclusive Effect Of The Aggregation Decision Itself[:] (a) A judicial decision to deny 
aggregate treatment for a common issue by way of a class action should have issue-preclusive effect in 
other courts as to the bases for that decision, as determined by reference to the preclusion principles 
ordinarily applicable in the rendering court. (b) Where a denial of aggregate treatment does not 
qualify for preclusive effect under subsection (a), that denial should raise a rebuttable presumption 
against the same aggregate treatment in other courts as a matter of comity.”). 
 190. See id. § 2.11 cmt. b illus. 1–2, at 214–15.  
 191. See id.; see also Moorcroft, supra note 20, at 243–48 (stating that issues of federal due process 
deserve issue preclusive effect).  
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The proposed standard of rebuttable presumption as a matter of 
comity tries to strike a balance between the need for finality of court 
decisions and the peculiarities of class action litigation. By making the 
denial of certification a presumption that may be rebutted in the second 
class action, the Principles preserve the necessary flexibility and at the 
same time demonstrate a healthy level of comity to the previous decision. 
The Principles are even careful to propose a more lenient approach to 
the rebuttable presumption than the one traditionally expected.192 
Whatever the improvements to the current law brought by the new 
ALI proposal, however, its advantages were lost in the comments, which 
missed the opportunity to explain how exactly the new proposed 
standard of “rebuttable presumption as a matter of comity” differs from 
the traditional application of the issue preclusion doctrine. The only two 
examples raised by the Principles as a basis for rebuttal of the 
presumption are not helpful to understanding the newly proposed 
system. 
One example was lack of adequacy of representation.193 However, as 
we have seen above, adequacy of representation is also required by the 
courts that apply issue preclusion to the denial of certification.194 And it 
could not be any different, because no class action order may bind absent 
members if adequacy is lacking. The requirement of adequacy of 
representation is particularly relevant in an order denying class 
certification, which, as we have seen, is issued before class certification 
without notice to the class and opportunity to be heard.195 
The other example given in which the presumption could be 
rebutted was “when the basis for the earlier denial (such as inadequacy 
of the particular class counsel to represent the proposed class) is no 
longer present in a subsequent proceeding (due to a change of counsel to 
one who would adequately represent the proposed class).”196 This 
example also represents no departure from the current law because, as 
seen above, issue preclusion requires the existence of the same issues in 
 
 192. See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 2.11 cmt. c, at 180 (2010) (“The 
expectation of this Section is that situations for rebuttal of the presumption stated here may arise more 
frequently than situations with respect to some other presumptions used in the law, as to which 
successful rebuttal is relatively rare.”). 
 193. See id. (“One important basis for rebuttal of the presumption consists of the affirmative 
demonstration of inadequate representation in connection with an earlier denial of class 
certification.”). As a matter of fact, the language on adequacy is a leftover from the older versions of 
the ALI project, when the solution was the application of the traditional issue preclusion doctrine. See 
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 2.11 cmt. c., at 216 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2008) 
(“The court in the second proceeding also should consider whether the earlier denial of aggregate 
treatment resulted from inadequate representation on the aggregation question itself.”).  
 194. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 195. See supra Part III.C.2; see also supra Part III.C.4.  
 196. See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 2.11 cmt. c, at 180 (2010).  
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both proceedings.197 If a court determines that class counsel was not 
adequate, this decision should have no binding effect on the adequacy of 
a different class member or class counsel. 
Judging from these examples alone, the ALI proposal would 
represent no innovation to the current debate of issue preclusion of class 
certification orders. In any event, it seems clear that these examples go 
against the language of the ALI proposal itself, which states that the class 
certification denial is a rebuttable presumption against “the same 
aggregate treatment.”198 The language is clearly too broad, because the 
proposal cannot create a presumption against the aggregate treatment, 
but only against the issues specifically decided in the previous 
litigation.199 
The ALI also missed the opportunity to propose a party-neutral 
rule. Its proposal is inexplicably limited to a judicial decision to deny 
class certification.200 It says nothing about the preclusive effect of a 
decision to grant class certification. However, it is reasonable to expect 
that the best interpretation to this proposal is to give the same effect, 
whatever that is, to either decision.201 
D. Analogy to Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction 
Kevin Clermont has recently tried to address the issue by comparing 
the denial of class certification with the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction 
(subject matter or personal).202 The essence of his theory is that a court 
has authority to determine that it does not have authority to adjudicate a 
controversy and that this decision is binding on the parties. Therefore, a 
denial of class certification should have the same limited preclusive effect 
as a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.203 This analogy led to the conclusion 
that “[t]he decisions implicit in a no-certification ruling have a binding 
effect in any attempt to sue again in a court where the exact same issue 
arises.”204 
 
 197. See supra Part III.C.5.  
 198. See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 2.11 cmt. b, at 179 (2010). 
 199. See supra Part III.C.5 (discussing the necessity of same issues of fact). 
 200. See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 2.11 (2010). 
 201. See supra Part III.C.8 (discussing the necessity of a preclusion rule that is equally applied to 
grants and denials of class certification). 
 202. See Clermont, supra note 80, at 218–27 (analogizing jurisdictional determination to class 
certification). Clermont had opportunity to discuss the issue previously, in the context of individual 
litigation. See Casad & Clermont, supra note 4, at 263–72 (discussing both jurisdiction to determine 
jurisdiction as well as jurisdiction to determine no jurisdiction). 
 203. See Clermont, supra note 80, at 225–27 (“A denial of personal jurisdiction in an ordinary 
lawsuit works much the same as denial of class certification, because the latter announces that the 
court will not exercise personal jurisdiction over the absentees. . . . [T]he analogy may not be perfect, 
but it seems strong enough to conclude that a finding that no class exists should be as binding as a 
finding that no jurisdiction exists.”).  
 204. Id. at 229 (“[P]reclusion [of the class certification order] may extend to the absentees, who 
Gidi_63-HLJ-1025 (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2012 6:21 PM 
May 2012]     ISSUE PRECLUSION & CLASS CERTIFICATION 1067 
The analogy is not devoid of academic interest, but is not helpful to 
solve the practical issues discussed in this Article because it suffers from 
the same limitations discussed above regarding the issue preclusion 
doctrine.205 First of all, as Clermont makes abundantly clear throughout 
his article, dismissal for lack of jurisdiction (and consequently denial of 
class certification) is preclusive only if both lawsuits involve the exact 
same issue.206 As we have seen, it does not take much for the second class 
action certification to raise different issues from the first one.207 
Second, as Clermont also recognizes, a dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction is preclusive only to the parties to the suit.208 Therefore, the 
analogy does not deal with all the policy and doctrinal hurdles of 
applying preclusion to nonparties.209 The issue is not whether a denial of 
class certification is binding on the parties of the proceeding in which it 
was issued in the same and in any future class proceeding (until the 
moment when the class is certified, the party is the putative class 
representative, not the class).210 There is no need to resort to the analogy 
of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction to answer this question. Rather, 
the issue is whether absent class members are bound by a denial of class 
certification, and Clermont’s analogy does not help answer this 
question.211 
In addition, Clermont’s analogy does not deal with any of the other 
objections raised above: the class certification order is a discretionary 
 
would thus be in privity with the class representatives for that limited purpose. By analogy to the 
jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine, the absentees would face preclusion if the exact 
same issue arose when they sought certification elsewhere.”). Because “[t]he denial of certification 
makes the absentee a stranger to the action for all other purposes,” “the decision not to certify should 
carry no other preclusive effects,” and “[t]here should be no preclusion on the merits.” Id. 
 205. See supra Part III.C.  
 206. See Clermont, supra note 80, at 221 (“The initial court’s ruling that it lacks authority should 
prevent a second try that presents exactly the same issue. The initial ruling will defeat jurisdiction in any 
attempt to sue again in a second court where the same jurisdictional issue arises . . . .” (emphasis 
added)); see also id. at 226 (“[T]he [preclusive] effect [of class certification denials] should be limited 
to binding only on the factual and legal issues that generated the no-certification ruling if they arise in 
a repeated attempt to certify.”). The same warnings are repeated several times throughout Clermont’s 
paper. 
 207. See supra Part III.C.5 (discussing Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011)). 
 208. See Clermont, supra note 80, at 218 (stating that dismissal for lack of jurisdiction precludes 
the same parties); see also id. at 226 (“Cutting against the analogy [between a dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction and a class certification denial] is that the determination of no jurisdiction over the 
defendant binds the ordinary plaintiff, over whom the court in fact has personal jurisdiction. In the 
class action setting, the aim is instead to bind a noncertified class absentee.”). 
 209. Clermont does offer a response, but it is not convincing. See id. at 218–19 (presenting a 
fourfold response). 
 210. Even in this limited situation, application of preclusion is debatable. The same class 
representative may bring the same class action representing the same class against the same defendant 
if the certification issues are not the same or if the defect is corrected. See supra Part III.C.5.  
 211. See supra Part III.C.2 (arguing that without class certification, the class and the absent class 
members are not parties to the class action). 
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decision; is not a final judgment, necessary, or essential; and absent 
members did not have an opportunity to opt out or receive notice.212 
Each of these objections independently defeats any preclusion of a class 
certification order. 
Because the analogy to jurisdiction to determine no jurisdiction 
faces the same doctrinal and policy problems faced by the direct 
application of issue preclusion of class certification orders, it does not 
seem to be a relevant or helpful analogy. Perhaps the only interesting 
lesson here, which reinforces a central thesis in this Article, is that 
jurisdiction to determine no jurisdiction operates in a perfectly 
symmetrical way because jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction has the 
same effect.213 
Conclusion 
In class action litigation, courts are faced with issue preclusion 
problems that are strikingly different from those encountered in 
traditional individual civil litigation. The fact that absent class members 
are not parties to the litigation and have no individual control over it; 
that they are represented by a self-appointed peer, in reality controlled 
by the class counsel whose interests are in constant conflict with the class; 
and that they must receive adequate notice and adequate representation, 
all conspire to create an extremely complex structure that may require 
adaptation of the traditional rules of issue preclusion. Adaptation, 
however, does not mean complete abandonment of the general principles 
of the preclusion doctrine or due process. 
Nowhere is there a more vibrant example of the practical and 
theoretical problems of issue preclusion than in its application to 
certification orders. This controversy has generated a great amount of 
unnecessary disagreement amongst courts and commentators. This 
Article has discussed the numerous problems with giving preclusive 
effect to certification orders. It also discussed several proposals that have 
been advanced to deal with the issue (preclusion, law of the case, stare 
decisis, rebuttable presumption, and comity). This Article reveals, 
however, that it is not politically or doctrinally sound to give preclusive 
effect to class certification orders. Absent class members, therefore, are 
not bound by class certification orders and may file the same class action 
in any jurisdiction and litigate the same certification issues again. 
The only viable solutions are ones that would give some form of 
stability to the decision without the definitiveness of preclusion. They 
represent an interesting beginning to a more serious conversation than 
the one we have had so far. They are a step in the right direction, but 
 
 212. See supra Part III.C.  
 213. See Clermont, supra note 80, at 218–27; see also supra Part III.C.8.  
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they do not offer an adequate solution to the intractable problems 
involved in the effects, if any, of a class certification order. 
The mere enunciation of a familiar rule, as attractive a solution as it 
might seem, has no meaning unless followed by reasonable and workable 
criteria for its practical application. Granted, criteria might be developed 
by case law, but without previous guidance, the courts might blindly apply 
the principles of law of the case, stare decisis, rebuttable presumption, or 
comity without proper regard to the peculiarities of the class certification 
problem, exactly as they have been doing so far. These solutions also 
have their own peculiar problems because they do not have the benefit of 
all the factors and requirements that the preclusion doctrine has slowly 
built in the past century. A proposal that leaves much of the details of its 
application to the courts is tantamount to no rule at all. 
Whatever the rule, courts need direction on how to apply it, in part 
because they have not done a very good job in the past few decades. This 
Article has discussed several concerns in favor of and against the 
application of preclusion to class certification decisions. Judicial 
economy and fairness to the defendant favor the application of 
preclusion, while fairness to the class might counsel a more careful 
approach. These issues could be addressed if the second court performs 
an independent analysis of the adequacy of the representative in the first 
class action and takes into consideration that absent members were not 
given notice or the opportunity to opt out of the first class action lawsuit. 
The second court must take into consideration the discretionary nature 
of the first decision, as well as the fact that it could be modified at any 
time in the first proceeding. The second court must also be free to apply 
its own procedural law to the certification issue. 
No clear-cut rule can solve this problem. Courts might need to take 
a balancing approach, addressing all the legitimate interests of the class 
and the defendant, as well as the expectations of the judicial system. If all 
these concerns are taken into consideration, the second court may give 
some precedential or presumptive effect to the prior class certification 
decision, as long as it reserves also some flexibility to reconsider the 
analysis of some issues. The basic principle is that certification decisions, 
both the original as well as the successive ones, must be carefully 
constructed. 
Alternatively, if it is not possible to construct a proper standard, the 
best rule may be simply not to give any preclusive effect at all to class 
certification decisions214 and to let the market decide whether it makes 
sense for the class to refile a class action and run the risk of wasting time 
 
 214. See Note, supra note 25, at 2038 (“[S]ome risk of duplication of litigation is an inevitable cost 
of a system in which federal district court judges have broad discretion to deny class certification and 
states are free to manage their own judicial systems with their own class action rules.”).  
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and money in pursuing an avenue that most probably will be denied 
multiple times. Despite the potential impact upon defendants, the 
limitations that class counsel face are also not negligible: It is not 
economically viable to keep litigating losing class certification issues.215 
In deciding that a certification order has no preclusive effect, the 
Supreme Court, in Smith v. Bayer Corp., was favorably influenced by both 
proposals described above, but without expressing any critical judgment. 
As the Court stated, “our legal system generally relies on principles of 
stare decisis and comity among courts to mitigate the sometimes 
substantial costs of similar litigation brought by different plaintiffs.”216 
The Court did not engage further in the discussion of the issue. 
In any event, whatever the rule might be, it must be neutral: The 
same rule must apply to decisions granting or denying class certification. 




 215. Compare Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 883 (2008) (refusing to apply preclusion simply for 
fear of repetitive litigation and stating that “the human inclination not to waste money should 
discourage suits based on claims or issues already decided”), with Alvarez v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 
49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 892, 903 (Ct. App. 2006) (“When appellants’ counsel was asked in oral argument 
when the string of unsuccessful lawsuits would end, his answer in essence was—when the pursuit is no 
longer economically feasible. We disagree. . . . It is manifestly unfair to subject respondent to a 
revolving door of endless litigation.”).  
 216. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2381 (2011) (holding that a certification order has no 
preclusive effect against absent members because they are not parties to the litigation and because the 
certification rules are different in different jurisdictions). 
 217. See supra Part III.C.8 (discussing the necessity of a preclusion rule that is equally applied to 
grants and denials of class certification). 
